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For the last century, the prospect of a permanent International Criminal Court (hereinafter 
the “ICC”) to adjudicate crimes of international concern has been under consideration by the 
international community.1  Proponents insist an ICC will provide a neutral forum necessary to 
overcome legal barriers to bringing war criminals to justice.2  Clearly, there are benefits to 
international law by the creation of an ICC,3 but several valid concerns4 exist, including the 
rather monumental problem that the United States may not legally become a part of the ICC 
without an amendment to its Constitution. 
                                                            
1 Bryan F. MacPherson, Building An International Criminal Court for the 21st Century, 13 Conn. J. Int’l L. 1, 11 
(Winter, 1998). 
2 Kai I. Rebane, Extradition and Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal Court to Safeguard 
Individual Rights, 19 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1636, 1672 (1996); See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International 
Human Rights Law in International Law 894, 895 (Barry E. Carter & Philip R. Trimble eds., 1995). 
3 Daniel B. Magraw, Report of the American Bar Association in Support of the ICC, presented to the American Bar 
Association Mid-Year Conference, San Diego, CA, 1 (19 February 2001). 
4 Patricia A. McKeon, An International Criminal Court: Balancing the Principle of Sovereignty Against the 
Demands for International Justice, 12 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 535, 538 (1997); See Joel Caviccia, The 
Prospect for an International Criminal Court in the 1990’s, 10 Dick. J. Int’l L. 223 (1992) (claiming that competing 
forces of “sovereignty” and “international order” have previously frustrated promulgation of a permanent 
International Criminal Court.) 
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On July 17, 1998, a United Nations Conference in Rome, Italy, approved the “Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.”5  The vote was one hundred and twenty to seven, 
with twenty-one abstentions.  Most notably, the United States, Israel, and China were among 
those voting against the convention.6  Pursuant to the Statute, the ICC will be created when it is 
ratified by sixty nations.7  Thus far, one hundred and thirty-nine nations have signed the 
convention, including the United States, and twenty-nine countries have ratified the treaty.8  The 
United States has made it clear, however, it will not ratify the treaty in the near future.9  One of 
the major limitations to ratification by the United States is the perceived possible violation of the 
United States Constitution of becoming a part of such a court.  In May 2002, President George 
W. Bush formally "unsigned" the ICC treaty and began the diplomatic process of negotiating 
agreements with States that are signatories to "guarantee Americans would not be extradited" to 
the ICC.10 
 The purpose of this paper is (1) to provide historical background to the ICC; (2) to 
provide an overview of the ICC structure, including the court’s subject matter and personal 
matter jurisdiction; and, primarily, (3) to analyze and discuss the constitutional objections to 
possible United States ratification. 
II. History of the International Criminal Court 
 
                                                            
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, reprinted at 37 ILM 998 
(1998) (hereinafter “ICC Statute”). 
6 John R. Schmertz, Jr. and Michael Meier, By Large Majority, U.N. Conference in Rome Approves Permanent 
International Criminal Court, 4 Int’l L. Update 88 (July, 1998). (Even if the executive branch of the United States 
had supported the statute, Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated 
that a proposal for an international tribunal that could prosecute American soldiers for war crimes would be “dead 
on arrival” at his committee).  
7 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art 126(1). 
8 See Ratification Status at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (updated 27 February 2000). 
9 Nicholas S. Curabba, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Selected Legal and Constitutional 
Issues, Congressional Research Services, 12 (February 22, 1999) 
10 Davis, Stephen F., The International Criminal Court: A Return To Nuremberg?, Proceedings, 70, 72 (March 
2003). 
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The ICC Statute is not a novel idea.  The concept of an ICC was first discussed in the late 
nineteenth century incident to the Hague Conventions.11  However, world politics, concerns 
about protecting national sovereignty, and the Cold War all contributed to stifling the ICC’s 
development.  Although a complete historical review12 of the effort to create an ICC is beyond 
the scope of this paper, there are several important milestones the discussion of which will 
provide context.  
A. Pre-World War I History 
The origin of the creation of an international penal code and ICC can be traced back to 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  The First Hague Convention in 1899 is noteworthy 
for the creation of the Court of Arbitral Justice.13  Then, in 1907 at the Second Hague Peace 
Conference, various States, including the United States, perceived a conflict between the 
jurisdictional power of the United States Supreme Court and the potential jurisdictional power of 
the proposed ICC.14  As discussed infra, these same concerns exist relating to the United States 
joining the ICC today. 
The Hague Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
which codified the principles of war on land and set out the foundation for the Nuremberg Trials, 
was an important instrument in the evolving international consensus that an ICC was needed.15  
And notably, the later Nuremberg International Military Tribunal specifically recognized the 
                                                            
11 Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulation concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899: 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Oct. 18, 1907, 26 Stat. 2277, 
T.S. 539. 
12 For an entire historical review of the creation of the ICC see Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International 
Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 421 (Spring, 1995); 
Mark A. Bland, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes Committed in 
the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems, Prospects, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 233, 252 (Fall, 1994). 
13 Sandra L. Jamison, A Permanent International Criminal Court: A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections, 23 
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 419, 421 (Spring, 1995). 
14 Id. 
15 Bland, supra note 11, at 252. 
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1907 pact as declaratory of customary international law and, thus, binding on all nations, 
regardless of their signatory status.16   
B. The Versailles Peace Conference 
World War I kept the idea of an ICC in the background until 1919, but following the war, 
United States President Woodrow Wilson proposed the creation of the League of Nations.17  
Significant in the thinking by the League of Nations proponents was the reality that automatic 
weapons, chemical weapons, aircraft, armored vehicles, and other new weapons were used for 
the first time.  These new instrumentalities of war created far greater potential for non-
combatants to suffer from indiscriminate military attacks. 
In 1919, the Versailles Peace Conference created the Commission on the Responsibility 
of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties.18  The Commission concluded 
individuals responsible for genocide, regardless of rank or status, should be prosecuted before a 
multinational tribunal.19  The tribunal would apply “the principles of the law of nations as they 
result from the usage’s among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates 
of public conscience.”20  Not surprisingly, many States objected to the concept of having 
individuals of all rank subject to an international tribunal.  The United States, for example, 
argued that trying the Kaiser before a foreign power would violate Germany’s sovereignty.21  In 
the end, the Commission rejected the contention that high officials of enemy States could be held 
                                                            
16 Id. 
17 Jamison, supra note 11, at 422. 
18 Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years 
Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 415, 417 (Spring, 1998). 
19 Id.; See Memorandum of Reservations Presented By The Representatives of the United States to the Report Of the 
Commission On Responsibility, reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int’l. L. 95, 127-143; See Gregory P. Noone and Douglas W. 
Moore, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 46 Naval L. Rev. 112, 113 (1999). 
20 Id. 
21 MacPherson, supra note 1, 5. 
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“personally accountable” for starting war.22  For the future, however, the Commission did 
recommend penal sanctions be provided for initiating a war of aggression.23 One American 
commentator rationalized that while it “shocks our sense of justice that the monstrous war crimes 
of Germany should go unpunished, it is perhaps best, in the view of the interest of all the world 
and the future generations that this should be so rather than further seeds of hatred between the 
nations should be sown.”24 
Ultimately, Article 14 of the League of Nations Charter did create a permanent Court of 
International Justice, and the Executive Council of the League of Nations drafted a statute for a 
permanent Court of International Justice that was completed in 1921.  The Statute called for a 
High Court of International Justice to try crimes constituting a breach of international public 
order or against the Universal Law of Nations.25  This Court’s jurisdiction was limited to 
disputes in which the States voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction.26 In due course, many States 
ratified the Statute,27 but similar to the Rome Conference, the main exception was the United 
States,28 with the United States Senate failing to support a measure produced by its own 
President.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the permanent Court of International Justice 
was that it was the predecessor to the International Court of Justice following World War II.29 
In addition to creating the permanent Court of International Justice, during the 1930’s, 
the international community took a stance on the punishment of terrorists by setting up a 
                                                            
22 Id., at 5 
23 Id. 
24 George Gordon Battle, The Trials before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War Crimes, 8 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 17 (1921). 
25 MacPherson, supra note 1, at 7. 
26 Jamison, supra note 11, at 422. 




Convention on Terrorism to meet in Geneva.30  During the Convention, member States discussed 
the possibility of creating an international criminal code, extraditing terrorists, and creating an 
ICC.31  These reasons would very much resemble the calls for a modern ICC. 
C. World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunals and Control Council Ten 
The theoretical concerns hindering efforts to prosecute war criminals following the Great 
War were swept aside during World War II.  By the end of World War II, consensus within the 
international community had grown into four general principles of international law.32   On 
August 8, 1945, the four allied powers signed the London Agreement,33 establishing an 
International Military Tribunal.34  Unlike World War I, the United States, through the Justice 
Department,35 took the principal leadership role by demanding that Germany’s leaders be held 
accountable for war crimes.36  The Nuremberg Tribunal, as it was commonly called, indicted 
twenty-four high ranking Nazi officials on October 16, 1945, for war crimes, crimes against 
peace, and crimes against humanity.37   
Following the Nuremberg Trials, the Allied Powers agreed to prosecute alleged German 
war criminals apprehended within their respective zones of occupation.38  Thereafter, war 
criminals were tried by international tribunals called “Control Council 10” courts, created by 
                                                            
30 Id. 
31 Jamison, supra note 11, at 423. 
32 Jamison, supra note 11, at 424-425. (The four major principles were as follows: (1) Crimes against peace, defined 
as the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, 
agreements, or assurances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for any of the foregoing; (2) Crimes 
against humanity, defined as crimes such as murder or extermination; (3) War crimes, defined as any delineation of 
the Hague Conventions; and (4) Conspiracy to commit any of these crimes).  
33 London Agreement, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.  
34 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; MacPherson, supra 
note 1, at 8. 
35 Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent Proposals and American Concerns, 6 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev. 121, 126 (Winter, 1994). 
36 MacPherson, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
37 Id. 
38 See Control Council Law No. 10, in IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILIT. 
TRIB. UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 XVIII (1952). 
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agreement and largely following the Nuremberg precedent.  The courts held that crimes against 
humanity must be connected to a war crime or crime against peace.39  Thus, crimes committed 
before the war were not to be considered in Control Council 10 courts.40   
In addition to the Control Council 10 courts, United States General Douglas MacArthur 
established war crimes tribunals for Southeast Asia in Tokyo,41 with less serious Japanese 
defendants tried in Yokohama.42  Since the United States controlled the Pacific Theater during 
the war, an international agreement similar to the London Agreement was not required to 
establish the Japanese tribunals.43 
 The Tribunals set up at Nuremberg and Tokyo are recognized as the first international 
tribunals to bring war criminals to justice.44  The Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, hereinafter 
the Nuremberg Charter, became a piece of the foundation for a permanent ICC.  For example, 
article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter provided for the punishment of crimes against peace;45 
Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg Charter provided for the punishment of war crimes;46 and Article 
6(c)47 of the Nuremberg Charter provided the first formal definition and punishment of crimes 
                                                            
39 Id. 
40 Lippman, supra note 17, at 432. 
41 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589. 
42 MacPherson, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
43 Although General MacArthur unilaterally set up the Tokyo Tribunals, the nineteen Allied countries appointed a 
judge to sit in Tokyo.  See Joseph Berry Keenan and Brendan Francis Brown, Crimes Against International Law 1-2 
(1950); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, 1999 St. Louis Warsaw Trans. 
L. 55, 62 (1999). 
44 Noone, supra note 18, at 114. 
45 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 33, at Art. 6(a) states that crimes against peace are namely the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
46 Id., at Art. 6(b) provided punishment for violations of the laws or customs of war.  Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity.  
47 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 33, at Art. 6(c), which provides for the punishment of crimes against 
humanity, namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of 
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against humanity.48  The format that was established under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter 
proved highly successful for the Tribunal.49   These Tribunals set an “important precedent by 
signaling the international community’s resolve to hold individuals, whether government 
officials or others, personally accountable for war crimes.”50 And, by creating individual 
accountability, the Tribunals thus rejected the World War I position that state sovereignty is a 
defense for egregious crimes committed against mankind.51 
 The United Nations Charter, formed simultaneously with the Nuremberg Charter, also 
embodies several of the Nuremberg Principles.  For example, the United Nations Charter states 
that “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state....”52  The ICC’s creation 
evolved primarily from the Nuremberg Tribunals and the United Nations, which encouraged the 
progress of international criminal law.53  
D. The Cold War Era 
In 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations appointed the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to investigate the possibility of establishing a permanent ICC.  In addition, on 
December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly recognized “that at all periods of 
history, genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to 
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,” and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law 
of country where perpetrated. 
48 Id. 
49 Jamison, supra note 11, at 425. 
50 Noone, supra note 18, at 114. 
51 Id., at 114-15. 
52 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. NO. 993, art. 2, para. 4 (entered into force Oct. 
24, 1945). 
53 Noone, supra note 18, at 113. 
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adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which 
called for the creation of an ICC. 
In 1950, the ILC proposed a Code of Offenses, which defined crimes such as the 
violations of customs of war, conspiracy, and crimes against humanity.54  The ILC also included 
enforcement provisions, recognizing that, otherwise, the process would be doomed to fail.55  The 
ILC argued the aggression of one man should no longer be able to bring the world to its knees, as 
it had in World War II.56  However, the General Assembly did not vote on the proposed statute.  
Instead, the General Assembly decided to postpone consideration of the draft statute pending the 
adoption of the definition of “aggression.”  Today, the United States is still unwilling to support 
the creation of an ICC because of the continued dispute over the definition of aggression.  
During the 1960’s, concern over international crime continued to escalate, re-emerging in 
the context of apartheid and racial discrimination.57  In 1978, a report of the American Bar 
Association (hereinafter the ABA) argued for a court with jurisdiction limited solely to crimes 
associated with the acts of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against peace, drug trafficking, 
genocide, and torture.  The ABA report was designed to accommodate the perceived need to 
protect national sovereignty by calling for an ICC whose subject matter jurisdiction encompassed 
criminal acts solely recognized by international law.  In the late 1980’s, the Soviet Union, which 
had long opposed the idea of an ICC, began advocating the concept of an ICC to deal with 
terrorism.58 
E. The Modern Approach 
                                                            
54 Jamison, supra note 11, at 426. 
55 Id., at 427 
56 Id., at 427 
57 Jamison, supra note 11, at 427. 
58 MacPherson, supra note 1, at 12. 
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The modern campaign to establish an ICC can be traced to a speech given by former 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev before the United Nations General Assembly encouraging 
the trial of drug traffickers.59  Contrary to Gorbachev’s beliefs, however, other States foresaw a 
need for an ICC because of the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the demise of bi-polar 
stability, the rise of nationalistic and aggressive tendencies by many nations and the 
internationalization of trade and policy.60   
It was actually a group of Caribbean States, however, that most revitalized the proposal 
for a permanent ICC at the United Nations General Assembly in 1989.61  These States agreed 
with the Soviet position and argued that an international judicial institution could help address 
narcotics trafficking in the Caribbean.62  A majority of member States joined in, arguing that 
drug trafficking, global terrorism, and the birth of new nations created serious new problems in 
international law.63 
In 1991, the ILC adopted draft articles called the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind.64  The ILC transmitted these articles to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, who submitted the articles to all of the governments of the United Nation member 
States for review.65  In 1992, the General Assembly established a working group to discuss the 
proposed international criminal jurisdiction of the ICC.66   
                                                            
59 Evered, supra note 34, at 128. 
60 Jamison, supra note 11, at 428. 
61 See U.N. GAOR. 6th Comm., 44th Sess., 38th-41st mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/44/SR.38-41 (1989); See Evered, supra 
note 23, at 127. 
62 Noone, supra note 18, at 121. 
63 Rebane, supra note 2, at 1665 (1996). 
64 Jamison, supra note 11, at 430 citing Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR., 46th Sess., Supp., 
No. 10, at para. 173-174, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1993). 
65 Id., at 431. 
66 Id., at 431. 
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 In 1992, Professor Bryan MacPherson, a noted international law specialist, proposed the 
creation of an ICC completely independent from the United Nations.67  This idea is now a 
principal feature of the ICC, and one of the major points of contention for the United States.  The 
proposal set out the creation of a complete international code of crimes as a long-term goal.  As a 
short-term goal, the MacPherson proposal conferred subject matter jurisdiction only over war 
crimes and crimes against peace.  Soon thereafter, in 1992, Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Special Rapperteur of the working group established by the United Nations, published a revised 
version of a draft statute originally prepared and circulated in 1980.68  Professor Bassiouni 
incorporated a solution to the problem of the ICC’s applicable law through a system of 
transferred jurisdiction.69  Under this concept, the ICC would merely be an extension of the 
United Nations’ member States’ jurisdiction, and would apply the transferring States’ criminal 
law and rules of procedure.70 However, this would be dependent on the consent of the State to 
transfer the legal proceedings, with its concurrence the crime was recognized under international 
law.71  This proposal is similar to the current International Court of Justice structure of States 
agreeing to jurisdiction.  Eventually, this concept never reached the drafters of the ICC because 
of the “primary jurisdiction” of the Ad Hoc Tribunals created for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
discussed infra. 
 In the modern age, a further complicating trend involves the increased prevalence of wars 
fought within, not between, States.  Perhaps the best example of this is Cambodia, where more 
than 2 million people lost their lives from 1975 through 1978.  Similarly, in the former 
Yugoslavia Republic of Bosnia, a civil war began in the early 1990’s where Muslims, Croatians, 
                                                            
67 Id., at 434. 
68 Evered, supra note 34, at 138. 
69 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute, International Criminal Tribunal 29-46 (1992). 
70 Evered, supra note 34, at 139. 
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and Serbians sparked the first real concern of genocide in Europe since World War II.  This bitter 
civil war, sparked by ethnic differences, destabilized an entire region of Europe.  And, in the 
African State of Rwanda, the death of the Rwandan President touched off a bloody civil war 
where countless Tutsi and Hutus were massacred at the hands of the extremist Hutus.  Clearly, 
traditional international diplomacy was unable to respond to this form of intra-State conflict,72 
but there was a move after these situations had stabilized somewhat to bring war criminals to 
trial, leading to the international community establishing the International Ad Hoc Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.   
 F. International War Crimes Tribunals 
 1. Background  
 In the evolution of an effective permanent ICC over almost one hundred years, no events 
have less continuously led to consensus within the international community than the crises 
resulting in the creation of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Ad Hoc Tribunals”).   
a. The Former Yugoslavia 
 The summer of 1991 was extremely volatile and bloody for the former Yugoslavia.  
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25, 1991.  Immediately thereafter, a 
civil war began in Croatia between the majority Croatian and the minority Serbian populations, 
and the adjacent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, located between the remainder of Yugoslavia 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
71 Id. 
72 Speech given by the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Preparatory 
Committee on the establishment of an international criminal court, April, 1998.  
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and Croatia, was quickly brought into the civil war.73  The Serbian dominated Yugoslav Federal 
Army backed the Serbian combatants. 
 On October 15, 1991, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence 
and initiated the process to secede from Yugoslavia.  The European Community required that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina hold an independence referendum before it would recognize the Republic as 
a new State.  Although threatened with a blockade by the Federal Army, the Republic 
nevertheless held its referendum on March 1, 1992. Thereafter, the European Community 
formally recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign State on April 6, 1992, 
which led to a full-scale civil war within the new State.74 
   b. Rwanda 
 Rwanda was the second experiment by the international community in using the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals.  The pre-colonial rule by the Tutsi minority, and the Tutsi role in the governing under 
Belgian colonial rule, created resentment and distrust among the majority Hutu.75  In 1962, 
Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium.  From that time until July 1994, a variety of 
Hutu factions have controlled the military and government.76  During the post-independence 
period, sporadic inter-ethnic violence led to the flight of Tutsi’s into Uganda, where they formed 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).77  As a result of a 1973 military coup d’ etat, Major-General 
Juvenal Habyarimana took control of the Rwanda government.  Habyarimana’s regime was 
clearly pro-Hutu.78  With the increased threat from the RPF in the 1990’s, the government 
                                                            
73 Bland, supra note 11, at 238 (The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a centrally located region composed of 4.35 
million people, 43.7% of whom are Slavic Muslims, 31.3% Serbs, and 17.3% Croats).  
74 Id., at 239. 
75 Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 9 Fla. J. Int’l. L. 421, 422 (1994). 
76 Gerard Prurnier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide, 54, 74-213 (1995). 
77 Id. 
78 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Rwanda Human Rights Practices (1994) (all citizens were required to carry ethnic identity 
card.  Ethnicity was determined by patrilineal descent). 
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interned and persecuted the Tutsi under the pretense that those persecuted were accomplices of 
the RPF.79 
 On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated when 
unknown assailants shot down his airplane.  Within hours after his death, extremist Hutu militias, 
the Presidential Guard, and the Hutu dominated army began widespread and systematic slaughter 
of moderate Hutus and all Tutsi.80  The result of this violence was the killing of an estimated 
nine hundred thousand (primarily Tutsi), the internal displacement of two million Rwandan 
citizens, and a mass exodus of over two million (mostly Hutu) Rwandan refugees into Zaire, 
Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda.81 
 In July 1994, the RPF victory over the Hutu dominated Rwandan army brought an end to 
the genocide campaign of the interim government.82  In August 1994, the United Nations 
Security Council called upon the new Rwandan government to ensure Hutu wishing to return to 
their homes would not be victims of reprisals.83  The new government, however, indicated it 
intended to prosecute over 30,000 Hutu citizens for murder, genocide, and other crimes.84  This 
prompted the United Nations to take unilateral action to intervene in the crisis. 
  2. Establishment and Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals. 
 
 The Ad Hoc Tribunals, the first such international courts to be set up since World War II, 
have issued indictments and international arrest warrants, held fair and judicious trials, and 
handed down well conceived and just judgements and sentences.  The creation of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, however, was difficult, even though it was clear domestic proceedings were 
                                                            
79 Catherine Newbury, Background to Genocide in Rwanda, 23 Issue 12, 14 (1995). 
80 Prunier, supra note79, at 192-257. 
81 Id., at 54. 
82 Id., at 299. 
83 See U.N. SCOR, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 2414th mtg, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/42 
(1994). 
84 Holly Burkhalter, Ending the Cycle of Retribution in Rwanda, Legal Times, 19 (August 22, 1994) 
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inadequate in dealing with individuals accused of crimes against humanity.  The major difficulty 
was mobilizing the political will amongst the international community, and the resources 
necessary to establish the Ad Hoc Tribunals.85 
 By June 1992, the situation in Bosnia had deteriorated into chaos.  On July 29, 1992, 
Muhamed Sacirbey, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent a 
letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting intervention.86  In response, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 771, requesting that all States and humanitarian organizations to 
provide information relating to human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia.  Thereafter, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 78087 in October of 1992, which created an impartial 
commission of experts to examine and analyze the information collected through Resolution 
771.88  After repeated demands that the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia refrain from 
violating international law, the Security Council on February 22, 1993 created an international 
tribunal to prosecute offenders.89 
 Unlike the former Yugoslavia situation in which the Bosnia Ambassador sought help 
from the Security Council, the Security Council in the Rwanda case acted unilaterally.  On July 
1, 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 935, which requested the Secretary General to 
establish a commission to determine whether serious violations of humanitarian law had 
occurred in Rwanda, including genocide.90  The Commission concluded genocide and systematic 
                                                            
85 Elisa C. Massimino, Prospects For The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, 19 Whittier L. Rev. 
317, 319 (Winter, 1997). 
86 Bland, supra note 11, at 239. 
87 S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 1992 S.C. Res. & Dec. at 36, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992), reprinted 
in 5 Crim. L. F., Appendix A. 
88 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: 
Investigating Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 Crim. L. F.  279 (1994). 
89 Bland, supra note 11, at 240; See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 
(1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of the Security Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR. 48th. Sess., Annex, art.1, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993). 
90 S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR, 3400th mtg. At 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994). 
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and widespread violations of humanitarian law had been committed in Rwanda, resulting in an 
enormous loss of life and large numbers of displaced persons.91  The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda Statute was submitted to the Security Council in November of 1994, with 
the recommendation that the Security Council create an International Tribunal for Rwanda under 
the authority of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.92  In response to the Secretary-
General’s recommendation to create the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 955 creating the tribunal responsible for bringing those responsible for the 
most serious violations of international humanitarian law to justice.93  At the time Resolution 955 
was passed, Rwanda was sitting on the Security Council as one of the non-permanent members 
and was the only vote against the resolution.94 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Statute and the Rwanda 
Statute each has one hundred and twenty eight articles.  It is commonly thought the Tribunals are 
separate, principally because they were authorized by different Security Council resolutions and 
have different statutes, but actually, the Ad Hoc Tribunals are inseparably intertwined and can be 
considered one tribunal.  The Ad Hoc Tribunal’s statutes may well contribute the most to the 
development of a permanent ICC statute, clearly establishing that the international community 
has the ability to create a war crimes court during a conflict,95 rather than afterwards as in the 
case of the World War II tribunals.  
                                                            
91 U.N. SCOR, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125 (1994) 
92 Id. 
93 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
94 Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwanda War Crimes: Kigali Votes No on U.N. Resolution, Washington Post, 
November 9, 1994, at A44 (Rwanda cited three concerns that led it to vote against the Resolution: (1) the Statute 
contained no provision for capital punishment, (2) the Tribunal would only hear claims arising out of acts that 
occurred in the 1994 calendar year, and (3) the Tribunal was to sit outside Rwanda). 
95 Noone, supra note 18, at 116. 
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III. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
A. Background on the establishment of the currently proposed International 
Court 
 
In response to the inadequacies of the Ad Hoc Tribunal,96 the International Law 
Commission of the United Nations completed a draft statute for an ICC in 1993 and submitted it 
to the United Nations.  The 1993 ILC proposal limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to recognized 
Conventions,97 and adopted the Ad Hoc Tribunal’s procedures governing the detention of a 
person awaiting trial or appeal.  The Ad Hoc Tribunals, therefore, paved the way for the 
establishment of a criminal procedure for the ICC.  For various reasons, the General Assembly 
sent the draft back to the ILC for revision. 
In 1994, the ILC completed its work on the draft statute and again submitted it to the 
United Nations General Assembly,98 whereupon, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice in 1995.  
After considering the Committee’s report, the General Assembly created the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to prepare a text for 
submission to a diplomatic conference. 
During the United Nation’s fifty-second session, the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court was 
convened to finalize the establishment of an ICC.   The resulting Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court has 128 Articles.  To analyze each Article is beyond the scope of 
                                                            
96 See Noone, supra note 18, at 117, where it is stated that the Ad Hoc Tribunals were inadequate because (1) they 
were only temporary forums with both limited jurisdiction and time spans; (2) the difficulty to apprehend persons 
indicted for international crimes, which jeopardizes the ultimate success of the Tribunals; (3) the encouragement of 
selective justice; and (4) funding and staffing inadequacies. 
97 Jamison, supra note 11, at 434-435. (The ICC’s jurisdiction would be limited to the (1) Genocide Convention, (2) 
Geneva Convention, (3) Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Convention, (4) Apartheid Convention, (5) Convention 
Against Taking Hostages, and (6) Safety of Maritime Navigation Convention.) 
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this paper.  However, it is important to address the concerns that many States, most notably the 
United States, has in accepting the ICC.   
The ICC is the permanent court responsible for investigating and prosecuting individuals 
who commit such offenses as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Critical 
analysis is narrowed to the following areas: (1) a review of the ICC’s proposed structure; (2) 
subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC; and (3) personal matter jurisdiction of the ICC.   
B. An analysis of the International Criminal Court 
 
The four organs that make up the structure of the ICC99 are the Presidency, the Judiciary, 
the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.  These organs are very similar to the structure of 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals.  All who serve in a position with the ICC have diplomatic immunity.100  
1. Structure of the Judiciary of the International Criminal Court 
 
The hierarchical structure of the ICC is derived from both civil and common law.  If an 
international criminal rule of law is to gain acceptance throughout the world, it will not be 
sufficient that the trials of the criminals are just, but they must be widely recognized as just.  
Therefore, perceptions of fairness and due process are paramount in any international criminal 
justice system. 
The Presidency and the different court divisions101 are made up of eighteen judges who 
serve on the ICC and are elected on a full-time basis.102  If the workload of the Court is minimal, 
the judges may serve in a part-time status;103 and, if the workload becomes unmanageable, the 
President may petition the member States to the ICC Statute for an increase in the number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
98 Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR., 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 253. 
99 ICC Statute, supra note 5, at Art. 34. 
100 Id., art 48(2). 
101 The presidency and the judiciary are considered separate organs of the ICC.  However, the judges that make up 
the presidency also sit on the appeals court.  Therefore, both organs are discussed together.  
102 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 35(1), 36(1).  
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sitting judges.104  The member States to the ICC Statute nominate judges based on four different 
criteria, but there is no established means within the ICC to insure these criteria are followed, 
except through the Assembly of States, which eventually votes for the individual judges.105  The 
Assembly of States may establish an “Advisory Committee on nominations” to advise on the 
qualifications of the nominated judges.106 
The first selection criteria considered is that the judge must be of high moral character 
and qualified to serve on their States’ highest court.107  Second, the nominee must be competent 
in either criminal or international law.108  Third, the nominee must be fluent in one of the 
working languages of the ICC.109  Fourth, there may not be two judges from the same State.110  
(These criteria are similar to the requirements to sit on the Ad Hoc Tribunals.)  After nomination, 
judges are selected by secret vote by member States to the ICC Statute.111  Judges serve nine-
year terms.112  When selecting judges, several considerations, in addition to the required criteria, 
must be taken into account.  First, there must be representation of the principal legal systems of 
the world.  Second, an equitable geographical representation must be achieved.  Third, there 
must be a fair gender representation on the Court.113 
Judges are to serve without influence from outside sources, including their own States.114  
To ensure impartiality, judges cannot have other employment during their term,115 or engage in 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
103 Id., art. 35(3). 
104 Id., art. 36(2)(a). 
105 Id., art. 36(8). 
106 Id., art 36(4)(c). 
107 Id., art. 36(3)(a). 
108 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art 36(3)(b)(i) and (ii). 
109 Id., art. 36(3)(c) (The Official Languages of the Court are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish, Id., art. 50(1)). 
110 Id., art 36(7).  
111 Id., art 36(6)(a). 
112 Id., art. 36(9)(a) (At the first selection, one third of judges elected shall serve for 3 years, one third for 6 years, 
and one third for 9 years). 
113 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 36. 
114 Id., art. 40(1). 
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activities that may interfere with their impartiality.116  If a judge’s impartiality is questioned, then 
the judge is disqualified if a pre-trial court determines a conflict exists.117   
The President and the First and Second Vice President are elected by an absolute majority 
of the judges and serve a term of three years and are eligible only once for re-election.118  The 
President, the First, and the Second Vice Presidents make up the Presidency.119  If the President 
is unable to serve due to incapacity or disqualification, the line of succession falls to the First 
Vice President and then the Second Vice President.120  The Presidency is responsible for the 
administration of the different courts and the Registry, but not the Office of Prosecutor.121 
 After the initial selection of judges and the election of the Presidency, the judges are 
organized into an appeals division and a trial division, which also acts as the pre-trial court.  
Each division is balanced between experts in criminal law and international law,122 but there is 
an expectation that each judge will be competent in both.  Once a trial is complete, the convicted 
person or the prosecutor may bring an appeal based on a procedural, factual, or legal error.123  
(The concept that a prosecutor may bring an appeal after losing a case has caused great concern 
in the United States.)  If the appeals chamber finds an error, it may reverse or amend the 
sentence, remand a factual issue to the original trial court, or order a new trial before a different 
trial chamber.124 
  2. The Office of the Prosecutor 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
115 Id., art. 40(3). 
116 Id., art. 40(2). 
117 Id., art. 41(2)(a). 
118 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art 28(1). 
119 Id., art. 38(3). 
120 Id., art. 38(2). 
121 Id., art. 38(3)(a). 
122 Id., art. 39(1). 
123 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 81. 
124 Id., art. 83. 
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 The Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter the “prosecutor”) operates separately and 
independently from the other organs of the ICC,125 and operates with the assistance of several 
deputy prosecutors.126  The prosecutor must have experience in criminal law, competence in 
international law and expertise relating to sexual, gender, and age violence.  As with the judges, 
if an individual prosecutor’s impartiality is questioned, or if they have prior involvement with a 
case on a national level, the prosecutor must be disqualified if Appeals Court discovers a conflict 
exists.127  The prosecutor is prohibited from engaging in any activity likely to interfere with 
prosecutorial functions.  If there is a question of impartiality, the appeals division decides 
whether disqualification is necessary.128  
 If a reasonable basis exists, the prosecutor may initiate an investigation into a crime that 
is within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.129  (This prosecutorial independence and authority 
was strongly criticized by many States and was one of the major reasons the United States did 
not become a signatory of the Statute.130)  The prosecutor’s authority is not without check since, 
if a member State disagrees with the decision to either investigate or not to investigate, the issue 
may be sent to the pre-trial chamber.   
3. The Registry 
The Registry is responsible for all non-judicial aspects of the ICC.131  The Registrar is 
elected by an absolute majority of the Judges132 and heads the Registry.133  The Registry is 
                                                            
125 Id., art. 42(1). 
126 Id., art. 42(2). 
127 Id., art. 42(7). 
128 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 42(8). 
129 Id., art. 53(1). 
130 See Statement of David J. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. 
Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, July 23, 1998 (Hereinafter Scheffer Statement). 
131 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 43(1). 
132 Id., art. 43(4). 
133 Id., art. 43(2). 
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responsible for the Victims and Witnesses Unit, which provides security, counseling, and other 
assistance to those appearing before the ICC.134 The Registrar records the proceedings so that no 
voice will ever be silenced.135  Recording the proceedings ensures that what has shocked the 
conscience of humanity should be remembered for all time.136  The Ad Hoc Tribunals have a 
similar office, which has been quite effective in recording the tragic events in Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia.  A thorough record has proven one of the most important contributions of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals.137  
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICC 
1. ICC Statutory Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The majority of the State parties at the Rome Conference recognized the general 
principles of criminal law and the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court as being grounded in 
universally accepted and recognized law138 and decided the ICC has jurisdiction over (1) the 
crime of genocide, (2) crimes against humanity, (3) war crimes, and (4) the crime of 
aggression.139 These four crimes are considered part of the ICC’s inherent jurisdiction, because 
violations breach the safety and peace of the international community.  Because the controversy 
over the definition of “aggression” postponed the creation of an ICC during the Cold War, the 
drafters of the ICC Statute escaped this problem in a typical political manner – they postponed 
the definition until a later, undefined date.  This approach was strongly criticized by the United 
States and was another reason the Statute was deemed unacceptable.  
                                                            
134 Id., art. 43(6). 
135 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 280 (3rd ed. 1999) (stating that “a record must be kept to 
ensure that the conscience of humanity will not forget the wrongs that have been committed, that a society simply 
cannot forget.”). 
136 Mark W. Janis, The Utility of International Criminal Courts, 12 Conn. J. Int’l L. 161, 166 (1997). 
137 Id., at 167.  
138 See Noone, supra note 18, at 135 and 118 which states that general or customary international law results from a 
“general or consistent practice adhered to by states from a sense of legal obligation.” 
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The ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction is derived from customary international law 
codified in four main treaties: (1) the Genocide Convention, (2) the Geneva Convention of 1949, 
(3) the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and (4) the Nuremberg Charter.140  The crimes 
codified in these treaties are identical to the subject matter authorized for the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals.141  The Genocide Convention142 provides for the definition of genocide, which the 
International Court of Justice upheld as a universal crime.143  The Geneva Conventions, most 
notably “Common Article III,” creates protection for both military members and civilians during 
war.144  The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 codify the law of war.145  These conventions 
are combined with the Geneva Conventions to make up a complex system known as international 
humanitarian law.146  The International Court of Justice has recognized the consolidation of these 
conventions to represent “fundamental rules” to be followed by all nations, not just State 
signatories, because they constitute “customary international law;”147 and that the universal 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
139 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 5(1) (Article 6 defines the crime of genocide; Article 7 defines Crimes against 
Humanity; Article 8 defines War Crimes).  
140 Noone, supra note 18, at 118. 
141 See ITFY Statute, supra note 93, arts. 2(2), 3, 4(2) and 5; See ITR Statute, supra note 62, arts. 2(3), 3, and 4. 
142 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227. 
143 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina 
v. Yugoslavia), 1996 ICJ REP (Judgment of July 11). 
144 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3144, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.S. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
145 Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulation 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, July 29, 1899: 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Oct. 18, 
1907, 26 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539. 
146 Noone, supra note 18, at 119. 
147 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ REP para(s). 75, 79 (Opinion of July 8). 
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interpretation of the Nuremberg Charter makes individuals, in addition to States, responsible for 
violations of the crimes embodied in these conventions.148 
D. Personal Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ICC 
Once a State has ratified the ICC Statute, the ICC gains “complementary jurisdiction” 
over the relevant crimes committed within those nations in the future.149  The ICC has personal 
jurisdiction over a crime through three triggering mechanisms.  The first two triggers occur when 
crimes are referred to the ICC for investigation by a member State or through the Security 
Council of the United Nations.150  The third trigger is when the Prosecutor independently 
initiates an investigation.151  And if a reasonable basis for an investigation exists, the Prosecutor 
presents the evidence to a pre-trial chamber, which then decides to continue with an investigation 
and possible subsequent criminal litigation.152  The third trigger resembles a Grand Jury 
investigation in the United States.  
 1. The ICC’s Complementary Jurisdiction 
With the understanding that a State’s sovereignty should be respected, the ICC Statute 
emphasizes that the Court will only operate in a complementary nature to national 
jurisdictions.153   The ICC is not “intended to replace national judicial systems but to permit the 
exercise of jurisdiction in the absence of any national prosecution.154  Therefore, the ICC may 
                                                            
148 See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 
(Several principles on individual accountability arising from the Nuremberg Tribunal were later enumerated in the 
1950 United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law); See also International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l. L. 172, 220-21 (1947). 
149 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 11(2) and art. 12(1) (There is no retroactivity in regards to investigating the 
inherent crimes before a member State signs the ICC Statute). 
150 Id., art. 13(a) and (b). 
151 Id., art. 15(1). 
152 Id., arts. 15(2), (3), (4), and (5). 
153 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art.1 and ¶10 of the Preamble. (Article 1 states “An International Criminal Court (“the 
Court”) is hereby established.  It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of the international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”). 
154 Magraw, supra note 3, at 2. 
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not obtain personal jurisdiction if a member State has its own investigation, has decided not to 
prosecute, or the prosecution has already taken place.155  However, if a State does not genuinely 
carry out its prosecutorial powers pursuant to Article 20(3),156 the ICC may assume 
jurisdiction.157  In determining whether a State has genuinely carried out its duties, the Court 
looks at the purpose, timing, and impartiality of the national investigation or hearing.158  In this 
framework, it is argued the ICC actually enhances a State’s sovereignty through recognition159 
and understanding that no State, however powerful, may shield its affairs completely from 
external influence.160 
The ICC’s complementary jurisdiction is somewhat different than the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 
which have concurrent jurisdiction.  By having concurrent jurisdiction, one could conclude the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals could exercise primacy over any national court system.161  Although Ad Hoc 
Tribunals must make formal requests to the national courts to defer to the Tribunal’s 
competence, Ad Hoc Tribunals may usurp the national courts only when the national judicial 
system is determined to be disingenuous, or if the inherent crimes are tried as ordinary crimes, 
with possible lesser sentences.   
                                                            
155 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 17(1). 
156 Id., art. 20(3) states “No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 
or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court: (a) were 
for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or (b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due 
process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” 
157 Id., art. 17(1)(a) and (1)(b). 
158 Id., art. 17(2). 
159 See Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 539, 550-51 
(1992); See McKeon, supra note 4, at 536. 
160 See Oyvind Osterud, Sovereign Statehood and National self-determination: A World Order Dilemma, in 
Subduing Sovereignty, 19 (Marianne Heiberg ed., 1994) (Calling uses of sovereignty “murky and ambiguous,” 
which is hardly more than a regulatory concept and not actual supreme authority.) 
161 See Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 808 (1933), 
S/25704, art. 9 (ITFY Statute), May 3, 1993; Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), S/RES/955, art. 8 (ITR 
Statute), November 8, 1994. 
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Although in practice the ICC will be able to take jurisdiction from national courts for the 
same reasons, the ICC has veiled what the Ad Hoc Tribunals consider concurrent jurisdiction 
and primacy over national courts by use of the definition of complementary jurisdiction.162  But, 
unlike the Ad Hoc Tribunals, if the ICC takes jurisdiction over a matter, a State may object to the 
ICC at the earliest opportunity after the ICC’s assumption of jurisdiction.163  With a few 
exceptions,164 in that circumstance, ICC investigations are suspended until the jurisdictional 
dispute is resolved.165  (The ICC Statue also allows the accused to avoid the ICC’s jurisdiction if 
they have been successfully prosecuted in a State for one of the inherent crimes.166  This is to 
negate double jeopardy.167)  
 2. Extradition and Personal Jurisdiction 
A major point of contention surrounding sovereignty and personal jurisdiction of the ICC 
is the issue of extradition.  The practice of extradition has existed for over three thousand years, 
during which treaties and custom slowly formalized the extradition process and defined methods 
for pursuit of fugitives.168  A basic tenet of international law, respect for the territory and 
sovereignty of other nations, has both encouraged treaties and discouraged irregular rendition, 
such as kidnappings or other violations of a State’s sovereignty.169  Quite less evolved under 
                                                            
162 Lohr, Michael F., and Lietzau, William K., One Road Away from Rome: Concerns Regarding the International 
Criminal Court, 9 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 33, 40 fn. 33 (1998/1999). [Rear Admiral Michael Lohr is currently the 
Deputy Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy; Lieutenant Colonel William Leitzau is the senior legal 
advisor the United States Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff.  Both military officers were instrumental in the 
current United States position on the ICC and have intimate knowledge of the Rome Conference proceedings.] 
163 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 19(5). 
164 Id., art. 19(8) (Includes collecting witnesses statements, issuing of warrants, etc.). 
165 Id., art. 19(7). 
166 Id., art. 17(1). 
167 See Evered, supra note 34, at 142. 
168 Ivan A. Shearer, Extradition in International Law, 138 (1971).  
169 Rebane, supra note 2, at 1644-45 (1996). 
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international law is extradition from States to the ICC,170 which may be for the United States, 
unconstitutional. 
Member States to the ICC Statute, upon the written request by the ICC, are required to 
“surrender,”171 not extradite, a suspected criminal.172  The word surrender is used because 
extradition involves the surrender, by one nation to another, of an individual who has been 
accused or convicted of an offense outside the territory of the former and within the jurisdiction 
of the latter.173  Extradition operates under a type of treaty formally called “rendition.”  Illegal 
rendition, such as abduction, arises from the concept of reprisal and occurs outside the provisions 
of a treaty.174  In the United States, the extradition process requires an extraditing judge to “either 
deny extradition or commit for extradition, and then places the authority to extradite in the hands 
of the Secretary of State, who may or may not extradite.”175  The Secretary of State cannot 
extradite an accused if the extradition judge denies such action.176 
As with current extradition law, the ICC Statute appears to allow an accused a hearing by 
a member State’s court before surrender.177  Ideally, if the national court either does not agree 
                                                            
170 Jamison, supra note 11, at 424; See Magraw, supra note 3, at 5 stating that the United States “argues that there 
should be a prohibition against the surrender of indicted individuals to the ICC without the consent of the accused’s 
country of origin, if that country has not ratified the Rome Statute.” 
171 See UN Press Release, Friday 26 June 1998, which stated that “extradition refers to action between States and 
thus would not apply to an action between the States and the Court.  Thus, surrender would be more appropriate.  It 
was also stressed that the Conference was mandated to establish a sui generis institution and there was a need to 
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172 ICC Statute, supra note 5, at Art. 89(1) states “The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a 
person, together with the material supporting the request outlined in Article 91, to any State on the territory on 
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Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 572 (1974). 
174 See Kristin Berdan Weissman, Extraterritorial Abduction: The Endangerment of Future Peace, 27 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 459, 465 (1994). 
175 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, 198 (2nd ed. 1998). 
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177 ICC Statute, supra note5, art. 89(1) and (2). 
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with the ICC’s jurisdiction,178 or there is a procedural problem under the national law,179 the 
suspect will not be surrendered to the ICC.  Therefore, although labeled surrender, the ICC 
Statute attempts to model the current treaty system on extradition.  But, additionally, the ICC 
Statute requires member States to “ensure that there are procedures available under their national 
law for all forms of cooperation.”180  This can be interpreted to mean the ICC Statute is not self-
executing, but requires member States to pass national laws permitting or requiring surrender to 
the ICC, which would be separate from the extradition treaty system already established.181  As 
discussed infra, it cannot be argued the United States can use the current system of extradition to 
ignore potential constitutional questions.  
IV. United States Constitutional Objections to the ICC 
 It has been argued that there is “no point of having an International Criminal Court 
without the United States as member” because the ICC “would be utterly ineffective.”182  
Although this may be true, the United States will not properly be able to join the ICC under its 
current Constitution.183  The constitutional objections to the ICC fall under two categories: (1) 
constitutional institutional concerns, and (2) constitutional protection concerns.184  These two 
categories are barriers to effective participation by the United States within the ICC. 
                                                            
178 Id., art. 89(2). 
179 Id., art. 89(1). 
180 Id., art. 88. 
181 The ICC Statute does not state whether the treaty is self-executing.  However, art. 88 states that “State Parties 
shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national laws…” ICC Statute, supra note 5, at art. 88.  In 
addition, the fact that States that have ratified the treaty have also implemented legislation or changed their 
Constitutions to accommodate the ICC treaty makes it clear that it is not self-executing.  See Helen Duffy, National 
Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 5, 23 (2001). 
182 Fareed Zakaria, There’s More To Right Than Might, Newsweek, p. 43 (July 9, 2001). 
183 Since the ICC Statute violates the Constitution, the treaty would actually be invalid under international and 
domestic law.  A treaty is invalid if the treaty violates municipal law of one of its parties when that violation is 
“manifest and concerned a rule of internal law of fundamental importance.” See Janis, supra note 142, at 35. 
184 Curabba, supra note 9, at 12 (February 22, 1999); John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: 
An Examination of U.S. Objections to the Rome Statute, 19 B.U. Int’l L.J. 85, 108 (2000). 
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 The constitutional institutional concerns refer to the assertions that United States 
participation in the ICC would be impermissible because of substantial legal imperatives of the 
United States Constitution.185  Generally, a United States citizen could not be prosecuted by an 
international court for offenses that would be cognizable under the judicial power of the United 
States.186  Specifically, the constitutional imperatives make United States participation in the ICC 
impermissible because the ICC fails to recognize certain fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution – the most important of which is the right to jury by trial.187  One way 
to understand the United States constitutional objections is to present two scenarios and discuss 
the two main constitutional barriers within the scenario contexts when possible. 
A. Scenarios involving conflict between the United States and the ICC 
1. The Vice-President’s Scenario 
The President of the United States is scheduled to attend a Super Bowl game, and a 
terrorist sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran188 detonates a nuclear weapon within the 
stadium.  Due to the electromagnetic interference, the Vice-President of the United States is 
unable to ascertain whether the President has survived so he convenes a majority of the 
“principal officers of the executive departments” who all sign a written declaration to the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives stating the 
President is unable to discharge “the powers and duties of his office.”189  Pursuant to the Twenty-
                                                            
185 Id. 
186 Seguin, supra note 193, at 108. 
187 Curabba, supra note 9, at 12; See U.S. Const. Fifth Amendment, which states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 
188 The Islamic Republic of Iran is a signatory to the Rome Statute, but has not yet ratified the treaty. 
189 See U.S. Const. Amend. XXV. 
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Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Vice President assumes the duties and 
powers of Acting President. 
 While these events are occurring, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency learns 
through an unreliable source within the Iranian government that Iran, in coordination with 
several Islamic terrorist cells throughout Arabian Gulf States, is preparing tactical nuclear strikes 
against United States forces and its allies within the middle-east region.  Acting as the National 
Command Authority190 from the White House situation room in Washington, D.C., the Acting 
President orders an immediate full-scale nuclear strike against Tehran and all Iranian military 
bases.  The military and civilian casualties number in the millions. 
 Immediately after the United States strikes Iran, the President communicates with the 
relevant parties and reassumes his duties.  The remnants of the Iranian government immediately 
protest the United States’ action to the United Nations Security Council as a violation of the 
United Nations Charter.  The United States blocks the Iranian protest through its veto power, but 
Iran, a signatory to the ICC treaty, requests that the ICC Prosecutor initiate an investigation into 
possible international crimes by the Vice-President.  Pursuant to a legal interpretation set forth in 
an International Court of Justice advisory opinion that states nuclear weapons are only allowed in 
self-defense191 “under extreme circumstances in which the very survival of a State is in 
question,”192 the ICC prosecutor initiates an investigation into the Vice-President’s conduct.193   
                                                            
190 See the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1621, et seq; See also 10 U.S.C. §162(b). 
191 Self Defense has been interpreted according to the Caroline Rule which states that self-defense must be confined 
to cases which the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, over-whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberations.” See Louis Henkin, International Law 872 (3d ed. 1993). 
192 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 25 I.L.M. 809 (July 9, 1996); See The 
Department of the Army, Operational Law Handbook 5-14 (2000) [hereinafter Army Handbook], which states 
nuclear weapons are “not prohibited by international law.” 
193 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(1)(b) where civilian leaders are held responsible to the ICC where they “as 
a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where (i) the superior either knew, 
or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; (ii) the crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of 
the superior; and (iii) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to 
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It is eventually revealed that Iran was not behind the nuclear detonation at the Super 
Bowl, nor did Iran plan to attack the United States or its allies in the Gulf region.  Thereafter,  
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Vice-President both resign and a Grand 
Jury is impaneled to decide whether to bring criminal charges.  The President, in an effort to 
move on from the tragedy, uses his powers under the Constitution194 to pardon both the Vice-
President and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  This prompts the ICC Prosecutor 
to declare the United States has failed to properly investigate195 and prosecute the Vice-President 
for his alleged war crimes and orders the Vice-President to be surrendered pursuant to Article 17 
of the ICC Statute.196  The United States attempts to protect197 the ICC Prosecutor through the 
United Nations Security Council, and before the ICC pre-trial chamber,198 but fails.  The 
Department of Justice begins the process of surrendering the Vice-President to the ICC.  In 
response, the Vice-President immediately requests relief from the United States federal courts. 
 2. The General’s Scenario 
The de-militarized zone between North and South Korea199 becomes the site for increased 
hostilities between the United States and North Korean forces.  Ultimately, the North Korean 
military strikes preemptively Allied forces.  The Allied forces withstand the first attack, but it 
becomes inevitable that the Allied forces will not be able to withstand a second push.  The 
United States Commanding General, while personally in the territory of South Korea and 
understanding that his forces will soon be overwhelmed, orders tactical nuclear weapons to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.” 
194 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 1, which states “…and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses 
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.” 
195 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 20(3). 
196 See Id., art. 17(1)(a) and (b). 
197 Id., art. 19. 
198 Id., art. 15. 
199 The Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a signatory to the Rome Statute, but have not ratified the treaty. 
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used against North Korean forces pursuant to his interpretation of the pre-set200 rules of 
engagement201 prescribed by the National Command Authority.202  This halts the second 
advance. 
After a cease-fire is instituted, the President of the United States, succumbing to 
international pressure, relieves the commanding general, and convenes a Court of Inquiry to 
determine any violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the laws of war.203  The 
three Generals assigned to the Court of Inquiry personally know the accused General.  For 
national security concerns, the Court of Inquiry convenes in private.  After two weeks of 
investigation, the court clears the General of any wrongdoing stating that a concrete and direct 
military advantage was gained, and the General acted reasonably.204  The Secretary of the Army 
approves the court’s findings and no court-martial is convened or further action is taken.  North 
Korea, although not a signatory to the ICC Statute, requests the ICC to investigate.205  As with 
the Vice-President scenario, the ICC Prosecutor requests the United States surrender the 
General.206  The Department of Justice begins the process of surrendering the General to the ICC 
                                                            
200 The President has pre-delegated the use of nuclear weapons to military commanders to such a degree that half of 
the United States’ strategic nuclear weapons can be used without the President’s direct participation. See Louis 
Henkin, et al., Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 78 (1990); See also 10 U.S.C. §164. 
201 Rules of Engagements, or ROE, “are directives issued by competent military authority to delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat 
engagement with other forces encountered.  They are the means by which the National Command Authority (NCA) 
and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in the context of applicable political and military policy 
and domestic and international law.” The Department of the Army, Army Handbook 8-1 (2000). 
202 John R. Bolton, 40th Anniversary Conference Panel: The Risks and the Weaknesses of the International Criminal 
Court from America’s Perspective, 41 Va. J. Int’l L.  186, 190 (2000), where it is assumed that the defensive use of 
nuclear weapons would probably be considered a violation of the ICC subject matter. 
203 See Article 135 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
204 See Army Hanbook, supra note 210, at 5-4, which states that if the military commander acts reasonably in the use 
of force, they will not be held accountable. 
205 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 28(a)(i) and (ii) which states that the military commanders responsibility for 
ICC jurisdiction occurs when the commander “either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have 
known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and…that military commander or person 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission 
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” 
206 See Ellen Grigorian, The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional 
Concerns, Congressional Research Services, 10 (January 6, 1999), which states that, hypothetically, complaints 
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and, like the Vice-President, the General seeks immediate relief from United States Federal 
courts. 
B. Preliminary analysis of whether the Constitution is implicated 
  1. The ICC as an extension of the United States 
 Before the issue of the ICC’s constitutionality is discussed, it must be determined 
whether the ICC “is best viewed as an instrumentality of the United States or as a foreign 
entity.”207 Paul Marquardt, a noted commentator208 on the constitutionality of the ICC, argues the 
ICC is not an extension of the United States government, especially since the ICC will operate 
under its own laws and protocols from the authority of the entire international community.209  If 
the ICC is not considered an extension of the United States, but rather a separate foreign entity, 
the institutional and possibly the protection concerns of the Constitution are diminished. 
 Other promoters of the ICC, however, argue the ICC must be viewed as an extension of 
the United States.210  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held in United States v. 
Balsys,211 that: 
If it could be said the United States and its allies had enacted 
substantially similar criminal codes aimed at prosecuting offenses 
of international character…then an argument could be made that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
could be lodged against United States personnel serving in United Nations forces overseas; However, these is an 
argument that the ICC will not be able to pass judgment on the decisions taken by the United Nations and its organs. 
See ICJ Reports, Namibia Opinion 16, 45 (1971). 
207 Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of the International Criminal Court, 33 Colum. 
J. Transnat’l L. 73, 105 (1995) (This article is the most cited authority on the constitutionality of the ICC.  The 
Congressional Reporting Service, the research arm of Congress used this article as its sole authority in reporting to 
Congress on the constitutionality of ratifying the ICC.); See Matthew A. Barrett Ratify or Reject: Examining the 
United States’ Opposition to the International Criminal Court, 28 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 83, 108 (1999), which 
states that “one way to avoid the argument that either the full range of United States constitutional guarantees or key 
constitutional rights must be incorporated into the Rome Statute is to view the Court as an entity separate from the 
United States.” 
208 It should be noted that Marquardt and other pro-ICC commentators raise constitutional issues and then argue that 
such concerns are not complete bars to the United States joining the United States.  Anti-ICC commentators, such as 
David Scheffer and John Bolton, argue that joining the ICC would violate the Constitution, but they fail to offer 
legal analysis in support of their claims – i.e. they fail to discuss the major cases and analysis the Constitution. 
209 Id., at 105. 
210 Duffy, supra note 190, at 23. 
211 United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 683, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 1412 L. Ed. 2d. 575 (1998). 
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the Bill of Rights should apply…the point would be that the 
prosecution was as much on behalf of the United States as the 
prosecution nation. 
 
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, writes that the primary purpose of the Bill of Rights is “to 
afford protection to persons whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in an American 
tribunal.”212  Therefore, if the ICC is prosecuting in the place or on behalf of the United States, 
the ICC would be considered an extension of the United States judicial system. 
This analysis is supported further by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert.213  
In Reid, the Court stated that:  
any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory 
or final judgment, decree, or order of any court of the United 
States…holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil 
action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its 
agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or 
employee, is a party.214 
 
In the scenarios presented, and if the United States was a member of the ICC, this holding would 
have double meaning.  The Court uses the term “party,” which in United States legal practice 
means any individual or legal entity involved in a suit, on either side.215  And since the Vice-
President and the General are officers of the United States, and if the United States ratified the 
treaty, the United States would be obligated to provide judges,216 finances, support, and 
information to the ICC.  In these circumstances, since the ICC would be acting on behalf of the 
                                                            
212 Id. at 690. 
213 Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487, 76 S.Ct. 880, 100 L. Ed. 1352 (1956). 
214 Id. at 489. 
215 See Black’s Law Dictionary, 1144 (7th ed. 1999), which defines “party” as “one by or against whom a lawsuit is 
brought <a party to a lawsuit>.” 
216 There is also a constitutional argument that the United States could not be a part of the ICC because the Court 
would not follow the Article III guidelines in picking judges, allowing the judges to have life tenure, and also 
granting the judges appropriate salaries.  See Curabba, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
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United States, it would be an extension of the United States.217  Thus, since the ICC would be, 
essentially, a part of the United States, the constitutional rights would have to be applied.218  
 2. The use of extradition to eliminate any Constitutional concerns 
 If the ICC is not considered an extension of the United States, it could be argued the use 
of the extradition process would eliminate any ICC concerns involving the Constitution.  
According to some commentators, if the surrender of a United States citizen were likened to the 
federal government’s use of extradition treaties,219 the ICC would not violate the Constitution.220  
Marquardt argues the extradition analogy provides the strongest evidence of the compatibility 
between the ICC and the United States Constitution.221  The reason the extradition analogy is 
encouraged is because of the “rule of non-inquiry,” and the legal precedent that extradition 
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. 
 According to the rule of non-inquiry, United States courts generally do not review the 
procedural or substantive rights that an extradited individual would have in the requesting 
State.222   Rather, during an extradition hearing, review is limited to whether the Federal court 
has jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the extradition treaty, and whether there is 
                                                            
217 Reid, 351 U.S. at 490, In Reid, a superintendent of a prison, who was not a federal employee, but rather a district 
employee, was deemed an officer of the United States because he was required to keep prisoners of the United 
States and therefore he was to an extent an officer of the United States.  See Scott W. Andreasen, The International 
Criminal Court: Does the Constitution Preclude Its Ratification by the United States, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 697, 729 
(2000)., which states that “any prosecution undertaken by the court – whether involving the actions of Americans in 
the United States or overseas – would be as much on behalf of the United States as of any other party.”  
218 Barrett, supra note 216, at 106-107; See Marquardt, supra note 216, at 101-102, where the Judicial Conference is 
quoted as stating that “all the provisions governing domestic courts must apply in full if the United States is to 
participate in such a court without violating the Constitution.” 
219 See 18 U.S.C. §3181 et. seq. 
220 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 105; Curabba, supra note 9, at 14; Barrett, supra note 216, at 108 stating that 
surrender should be viewed as extradition for purposes of the United States constitutional analysis. 
221 Id. at 132. 
222 Barrett, supra note 216, at 107 citing Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512, 31 S.Ct. 704, 55 L. Ed. 830 
(1911) and Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123, 21 S.Ct. 302, 45 L. Ed. 448 (1901); Curabba, supra note 9, at 14. 
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evidence to support a finding of probable cause.223  Federal courts are bound by the existence of 
an extradition treaty to presume the trial will be fair.224  “This is because, before entering into an 
extradition treaty, the United States first determines whether the potential treaty partner has a 
judicial system that provides due process and humane treatment of detainees.”225  In the ICC 
context, surrender would entail “much more than an extraordinary extradition treaty.”226  
 It is tempting to analogize the surrender under the ICC, and extradition under a treaty, but 
such an analogy is misplaced.227  Extradition and surrender are fundamentally different.  Article 
102 of the ICC Statute defines surrender as “the delivering up of a person by a State to the 
Court.”228  Extradition, on the other hand, is the “delivering up of a person by one State to 
another.”229  The concept of surrender is already a specialized principal within Status of Forces 
Agreements (hereinafter referred to as “SOFA”) that are more akin to the ICC model, rather than 
the extradition model.230  Under a SOFA, surrender is understood to mean231 as the release back 
from a foreign sovereign of a military member to the individual’s State’s authorities – military 
and/or law enforcement – for certain criminal activities.232  The reason being that under a SOFA, 
                                                            
223 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 108 citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S. Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 
(1925); Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 617 (2nd Cir. 1991); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §478, 
note 2. 
224 Id. at 109.   
225 Patricia McNerny, The United States and the International Criminal Court: Issues for Consideration by the 
United States Senate, 64 Law & Contemp. Prob. 181, 186 (2001). 
226 Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There A Substantive Limitation On The Treaty Power?, 
37 Stan. J. Int’l L. 75, 90 (2001), which states that the ICC treaty would “subject the territory and citizens of the 
United States to the jurisdiction of the ICC, would subordinate the United States’ judicial authority to the ICC in 
cases within its jurisdiction, and would require the United States to surrender its citizens for trial and punishment.” 
227Andreasen, supra note 227 at 730. 
228 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 102. 
229 Duffy, supra note 190, at 20. 
230 For a discussion of Department of Defense policies on foreign criminal jurisdiction, see AR 27-
50/SECNAVINST 5820.46/AFR 110-12; Dep’t. of Def. Dir. 5525.1, Status of Forces Policies and Information (7 
Aug 74); see 32 C.F.R. part 151. 
231 See Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 A.J.I.L. 124, 127 (2001) stating that the NATO 
SOFA provides for a sharing of jurisdiction that gives the sending State the primary jurisdiction to try its military 
personnel for “offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.” 
232 Jordan J. Paust, The Reach of ICC Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals, 33 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 12-13 
(2000). 
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the sending State has primary jurisdiction over any acts that occur while in the exercise of one’s 
official duties.  Thus, for example, in the General’s scenario, if South Korea captured him, an 
obligation would exist to surrender him to the United States according to the current SOFA 
between the two countries.233 
Another reason the analogy is imperfect, as Marquardt also acknowledges, is that the 
surrender system was adopted for the ICC specifically to preempt comparisons between 
surrender and extradition thereby avoiding legal conflicts involving other State’s constitutions.234  
Therefore, the inverse argument is that, since the extradition system was specifically excluded to 
accommodate other States, one cannot then advocate use the extradition system for purposes of 
avoiding the United States Constitution.235  Furthermore, although Marquardt discounts the 
argument,236 the United Nations International Law Commission has concluded the ICC would 
not be competent to conclude extradition treaties because it would undermine the traditional 
concept of existing extradition treaties between sovereigns.237  In sum, based on the actual 
differences between the concepts of surrender and extradition, the current extradition system 
cannot be used to by-pass the need for constitutional protections. 
It also can be argued that, if the ICC Statute were equivalent to an extradition treaty, the 
ICC Statute would be self-executing238 in the United States, eliminating the need to have 
                                                            
233 See 2 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510, 373 U.N.T.S. 248. 
234 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 103-104, which states that “the ICC Statute speaks of surrender rather than 
extradition of individuals, apparently to accommodate those states having constitutional difficulties with extradition 
by allowing them to characterize surrender of suspects as a direct, non-discretionary treaty obligation rather than as 
a discretionary extradition.” 
235 See Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 249 which states that in the event of a conflict between an extradition treaty and 
constitutional provision, the latter prevails. 
236 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 107. 
237 United Nations Int’l Law Comm’n, Eleventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of 
Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/449 (1993). 
238 Extradition treaties have been deemed by the Supreme Court to be self-executing, therefore, there does not need 
to have implementing legislation by Congress.  See Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 199. 
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implementing legislation239 and possibly avoid any constitutional concerns.  However, because 
the ICC Statute specifically distinguishes itself from the extradition system240 and requires  
member States to pass legislation to ensure full cooperation with the ICC surrender system,241 
the ICC treaty is not self-executing.242  Therefore, implementing legislation would seem clearly 
be required for the United States to enforce any ICC obligations.243 
A final difference between extradition and the ICC’s concept of surrender is that under 
the United States extradition system there is not an “obligation to extradite.”244  The United 
States, like many nations, may refuse to extradite based on the “political offense doctrine.”245   
The political offense doctrine is made up of three principles.  First, the State is at odds with the 
requesting State and public outrage would ensue if the individual were extradited.  Second, the 
State does not believe the suspect would receive a fair trial within the requesting State.  Third, 
the suspect is being pursued essentially, for a political offense.  Based on these international 
realities, frequently, international criminals seek refuge in States with sympathetic ideology, 
which makes extradition less likely under the political offense doctrine.246   
                                                            
239 Id. 
240 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 102. 
241 Id. at Art. 88. 
242 See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States §111, comment (h) (1987), which states that 
if a treaty is silent as to execution, then implementing legislation is usually required.  Since the ICC could be 
considered silent, legislation is required. 
243 Implementing legislation was required for the United States to deal with extradition to the Ad Hoc Tribunals. See 
18 U.S.C. §3181. 
244 See Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 211 n.121, which states that this view is founded on the notion that the “State’s 
right to protect its sovereignty and its freedom to provide asylum to whomever it chooses may override the State’s 
obligation under the treaty.” 
245 MacPherson, supra note 1, at 20. 
246 Id. at 20. (For example, in 1988, Italy asked Greece to extradite Abdel Osama al-Somar, a Palestinian terrorist 
who had bombed a synagogue in Rome.  The Greek government bowed to popular political pressure and released 
Abdel after he served a short sentence for violating Greek Law.  Greece declined extradition and allowed Abdel to 
fly to Libya.  Another example, is when the United States and the United Kingdom requested Libya to extradite 
Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Fhimah, who were indicted for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988.  Libya refused extradition, claiming that it did not believe the accused 
would receive a fair trial in either the United States or the United Kingdom.) 
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The political offense doctrine is not addressed in the ICC Statute, most likely because it 
uses the system of surrender and not extradition, which the political offense doctrine is attached. 
The extradition system cannot be used under the ICC’s surrender model because a failure to 
cooperate with the ICC by surrendering a suspect leads to a referral to the United Nations 
Security Council or the ICC’s Assembly of States.247  Thus, the attempt by commentators to use 
the extradition system as an escape for a review of possible constitutional objections has no 
merit. 
  3. Territorial Jurisdiction and the issue of Status of Forces Agreements 
 There is a continuous concern that territorial jurisdiction248 questions make constitutional 
protection concerns moot if the extradition analogy fails.249 In the scenarios presented supra, this 
would only affect the General in Korea250 because he was physically in South Korea when he 
ordered the nuclear attack.  Since the General was present in South Korea’s territory, South 
Korea’s territoriality jurisdiction trumps the United States nationality jurisdiction.251  In regards 
to the Vice President, however, since he committed the act while in the United States, the 
territoriality argument combined with nationality jurisdiction would trump Iran’s territoriality 
jurisdiction for having the effect of the act in that State.252  The ICC, however, would still argue 
that it has jurisdiction.253 
                                                            
247 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 87(7). 
248 See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States §402, which discusses the different 
principles of jurisdiction. (1) Objective Territoriality Principle (Effects Doctrine) at §402(1)(c); (2) Protective 
Principle at §402(3); (3) Nationality Principle at §402(2); (4) Passive Personality Principle at §402, Comment g.; 
and (5) Universality Principle at §404. 
249 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 113. 
250 However, the Vice-President may be required to answer to crimes which had an effect in Iran, based on The 
Lotus Case, (France v. Turkey), PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10, p. 23 (1927). However, the governing principle is that Iran 
cannot take measures against the Vice-President while he is in the territory of the United States without the consent 
of the United States. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 307 (4th ed. 1990). 
251 See Seguin, supra note 193, at 127. 
252 See Seguin, supra note 193, at 127; See also Leigh, supra note 241, at 127; For the alternative argument that the 
Vice-President would be subject to South Korean law first because the effect of his acts were felt there, see 
Andreasen, supra note 227, at 726 citing Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2nd Cir. 1981), which held that an 
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 Based on the facts of the scenarios, in the absence of some kind of agreement254 – like a 
SOFA255 – the jurisdiction of the State in which the offense is committed will usually prevail 
over other claims of jurisdiction.256  An exception to the general rule of receiving State 
jurisdiction is deployment for combat, wherein United States forces are generally subject to 
exclusive United States jurisdiction.257  As the exigencies of combat subside, however, the 
primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction may revert to the receiving State.258  Thus, since 
the General’s acts took place outside the United States, constitutional rights appear not to be 
applicable.259  And, this seems true whether or not the General was acting under the direction of 
the “nation to which he owes his allegiance.”260   
The Schooner Exchange case highlights this rule, when Justice Marshall wrote, “the 
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is absolute and subject to no qualification 
except such as it has agreed to.”261   This, taken with Article 98(2) of the ICC treaty, which states 
commitments to the ICC do not supercede SOFA treaties,262 would mean, absent such an 
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262 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, at Art. 98(2); See also Grigorian, supra note 215, at 22. 
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agreement, if the United States sent the General to South Korea to face judgment, South Korea, 
as a sovereign nation, would have the authority to surrender the General to the ICC.263  
Based on Article 98(2), there appears to be some protection for Commanding Generals 
operating in countries that have SOFA’s with the United States.  Under Article VII(3)(a)(ii) of 
the NATO SOFA,264 for example, the United States has primary concurrent jurisdiction over 
“offenses arising out of any act or omissions done in the performance of official duty.”265  
However, under both international266 and United States law,267 acts that are considered 
international crimes may not properly classified as an act or omission done in the performance of 
official duty – by definition criminal conduct may not be official duty.  Therefore, for the types 
of crimes enumerated within the ICC Statute, a SOFA would not shield a military leader – like 
the General or the Vice-President – from surrender to the ICC and the ICC could try military 
commanders operating in foreign territory without a SOFA, if the State was able to obtain 
personal matter jurisdiction. 
C. Constitutional institutional concerns 
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The United States Constitution authorizes a finite number of federal government 
institutions, namely, the legislative branch,268 the executive branch,269 and the judiciary.270  Each 
of the institutions have limited powers.  One argument against United States participation in the 
ICC is that to do so would “amount to an impermissible use of constitutionally prescribed 
powers.”271  That is, if the ICC infringes any powers prescribed by the Constitution to the 
different federal branches of government, the participation of the United States in such a court 
would be unconstitutional. 
1. The ICC as a violation of the Constitutional powers 
a. The ICC versus Article III of the Constitution 
   (1) The ICC as inferior to the Supreme Court 
Article III of the United States Constitution empowers and limits the Supreme Court and 
the federal judiciary.  A major concern when discussing institutional objections is that the ICC 
will operate in violation of Article III,272 which states the “judicial power of the United States 
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.”273  The problem then is with the ICC not being subject to Supreme 
Court appellate review, even though vested with authority over United States citizens by 
congressional direction.   
A further problem is that if the United States ratified the ICC treaty, Congress would be 
creating a court that potentially could try United States citizens for acts that are crimes under 
                                                            
268 U.S. Const. art. I. 
269 U.S. Const. art. II. 
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271 Curabba, supra note 9, at 12. 
272 Id. at 14. 
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both international and domestic United States law.274  One of the top human rights counsel in the 
United States, who is in favor of United States ratification of the ICC treaty, despite the 
constitutional issues, admits that “the ICC can properly be considered an extension of the state’s 
own domestic jurisdiction.”275  Thus, in her view, if approved by Congress and signed by the 
President, the ICC would be considered a court inferior to the Supreme Court, whether or not it 
the ICC would be considered an Article III court.276  Of note, this concept is not addressed in the 
ICC treaty, and the final authority in regards to ICC cases is the Appeals Chamber of the ICC.277  
It appears clear the ICC will not be inferior to the United States Supreme Court in 
violation of the rule established in Reid v. Covert, which stated that the Supreme Court “has 
regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.”278  Rather, 
as discussed supra, the ICC will be complementary to the member States judicial systems.279  
Since the subject matter of the ICC may also be crimes within the United States, the ICC and the 
United States judicial system will, in reality, have parallel jurisdiction.280  Therefore, as in the 
case of the Vice-President and the General, once the ICC gains jurisdiction, there would be no 
appeal of any ruling, error, or sentence to the United States Supreme Court.281  Since the ICC 
                                                            
274 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 21(c), which allows the ICC to apply national law; See also Frank Newman, 
et. al., International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process, 556 (2nd ed. 1996) citing Justice Blackmun who 
stated that “international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts.” 
275 Duffy, supra note 190, at 23, citing Cherif Bassiouni, Observations on the Structure of the (Zutphen) 
Consolidated Text, Observations on the Consolidated ICC 12 (Ileila Sadt Wexler ed. 1998), where the professor 
states that “the surrender process in this case is akin to a transfer from one part of the national legal system to the 
international extension of the national system which would be the ICC.” 
276 If the ICC is inferior to the Supreme Court and the other two political branches acting together contravene an 
international legal norm, the Supreme Court is unable to review such conduct. U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. 
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Therefore, if the ICC were subject to jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, a 
great majority of cases could be dismissed as political questions. 
277 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 39. 
278 Reid, 351 U.S. at 488. 
279 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 1. 
280 See Brownlie, supra note 260, at 692, which states that an international organizations and its constituent treaty 
will normally leave the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction untouched. 
281 This is in complete contradiction to the declaration that the United States filed with the United Nations in regards 
to the International Court of Justice which stated that “disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within 
 44 
treaty attempts to create a judicial system outside the framework of the United States system, 
where the Supreme Court is the final authority, the ICC conflicts with Article III and is, 
therefore, unconstitutional.   
 (2) Non-military citizens before military tribunals 
In addition to concerns about superiority of the Supreme Court, the ICC system appears 
to violate the Constitution and established precedent interpreting the relationship of the judiciary 
to the other two branches of government.  For example, in Ex Parte Milligan,282 a case involving 
United States citizen being convicted before a military court when civilian courts were 
operable.283   Thus, the Supreme Court held the military court was not an Article III court, and, 
therefore, the military court could exercise no part of the judicial power of the country.284 
This concept is taken further in light of Reid v. Covert,285 where Justice Black tested the 
theory that Article III would be usurped if a foreign court attempted to adjudicate crimes 
committed by United States citizens within the jurisdiction of the United States.  The Court held 
that an American civilian “could not be subjected to trial in a military court overseas, even 
though an international agreement between Britain and the United States appeared to allow such 
a trial.”286  Justice Black wrote that “at the beginning we reject the idea that when the United 
States acts against civilians abroad,” it could do so free of the Constitution.287 
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Given the cases, it is clear non-military citizens cannot be tried in a military tribunal, 
either in the United States or in a foreign State, for crimes occurring within the jurisdiction of the 
United States.  And, this is true despite any treaty to the contrary.  This is instructive in 
considering the ICC is, essentially, a military tribunal in the sense that its subject matter is solely 
related to crimes occurring during war or armed hostilities – whether internal or between States.  
Therefore, the ICC could not try the Vice-President, in the scenario presented, because he is a 
civilian and such a trial would be in violation of Article III of the Constitution. 
   (3) Enemy aliens and military tribunals 
But, Marquardt asserts Ex Parte Milligan can be distinguished.288  In his view, Ex Parte 
Milligan is limited to civilian crimes committed by civilians, such as petty larceny.289  In support 
of this, he argues Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox290 stands for the proposition that in times of war, non-
Article III courts can be convened to adjudicate violations of the laws of war by civilians even 
though civilian courts are still operable.291  Thus, since the subject matter of the ICC deals 
exclusively with the laws of war, the ICC would be constitutional.   
Marquardt’s argument would be more persuasive if Ex Part Quirin dealt with United 
States citizens.  But, that case concerned a trial by military commission of German military 
personnel accused of acting as spies and saboteurs within the United States.  These soldiers were 
brought to the United States by a German submarine and deposited in key locations wearing 
German military uniforms.  Only when they reached American soil did they transferred to 
civilian garb.   
                                                            
288 See Marquardt, supra note 216, at 73.   
289 Id. at 130. 
290 Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942). 
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Justice Stone, writing for the Supreme Court, held in Ex parte Quirin that a United States 
military court could try enemy forces for the violations of the law of war if captured within the 
United States,292 which clearly limited this type of case to enemy aliens.293  Furthermore, Justice 
Stone stated that “in time of war and in the times of peace, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to 
preserve unimpaired the constitutional safeguards of civil liberty.”294  Thus, to argue Ex Parte 
Quirin should extend to the proposition that United States military members could be 
surrendered to a foreign court exercising Article III powers is a questionable leap, especially 
since  Justice Stone hinted at the limited scope of Ex Parte Quirin when he stated the Court had 
“no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of 
military tribunal to try persons according to the law of war.”295  He did, however, clearly state 
that if the military tribunal was in violation of the Constitution, the military tribunal would be 
invalid.296 
In addition Ex Parte Quirin, Marquardt and other commentators attempt to use the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its authority over military tribunals of enemy aliens captured 
abroad as persuasive authority for the proposition the ICC does not violate Article III of the 
Constitution.297  In Re Yamashita, Justice Stone, again writing for the Supreme Court, held 
enemy aliens had no constitutional based objections to being tried by a military tribunal set up by 
the victors to adjudicate war crimes.298  General Yamashita was the Japanese commanding 
general of the Imperial Japanese forces occupying the Philippines, which at the time of World 
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War II was a territory of the United States.299  Upon surrender, General Yamashita was 
immediately put on trial for war crimes before a military court.300 
Justice Stone clearly stated the holdings In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin dealt only 
with military tribunals dealing with enemy combatants,301 holding it was “an important incident 
to the conduct of war” for the “adoption of measures by the military commander, not only to 
repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who, 
in their attempt to thwart or impede our effort, have violated the law of war.”302  Justice Stone 
also emphasized the United States had actually declared war on the State of the petitioner,   
which effected the military commander’s ability to discipline “without qualifications as to the 
exercise of this authority so long as a state of war exists – from its declaration until peace is 
proclaimed.”303 Therefore, although Justice Stone points out in In Re Yamashita that United 
States military members were also subject to trial by military tribunals,304 with a United States 
judicial panel deciding guilt, the limited power to review such tribunal decisions and requires 
constitutional guarantees is limited to declared war.305  Thus, since in the scenarios presented, a 
state of war was not declared against either Iran or Korea, the cases cited by Marquardt can be 
distinguished on the facts. 
When the Supreme Court revisited the In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin decisions in 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court found in war, alien enemies do not receive constitutional 
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protections.306  To use these decisions, therefore, to argue that the Vice-President and the 
General in the presented scenarios should be surrendered to the ICC does not follow.  Both, the 
Vice-President and the General believed they were acting according to their constitutional duties 
to protect and defend the United States and her allies.   
 Even if these cases were persuasive authority, they are inappropriate within the context of 
the ICC.  As discussed supra, once a case is adjudicated within the ICC, there is no opportunity 
to appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  Justice Black, dissenting in Eisentrager, argues 
that when hostilities have ceased with an enemy nation, the enemy alien at least has the ability to 
file a writ of habeas corpus with the courts.307  Since the argument is that the ICC is an extension 
of the United States judicial system, and since the General and the Vice-President are both 
United States citizens, it would appear that, when hostilities have ended, they too would have the 
ability to seek habeas corpus relief from the United States judiciary.  But under the ICC treaty, 
this is not allowed, which calls into question whether the court is unconstitutional. 
    (4) Enemy aliens and international tribunals 
 Ex Parte Quirin, In Re Yamashita, and Johnson v. Eisentrager are all case dealing with 
United States military tribunals.  But, Marquardt raises another argument that the Supreme Court 
has never held Article III restricted the United States from participating in the international 
military tribunals at the end of World War II.308  In support of this argument Marquardt refers to 
Hirota v. MacArthur, where the Court held: 
the military tribunal set up in Japan by General MacArthur as the 
agent of the Allied Powers is not a tribunal of the United States 
and the courts of the United States have no power or authority to 
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review, affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences 
imposed by it on these petitioners, all of whom are citizens of 
Japan. 
 
Based on this, Marquardt relies on Hirota for the proposition that the ICC is an international 
body, not a domestic court, and, therefore, Article III is not violated.309 
 But this argument fails on several points.  First, as was articulated by David Scheffer, the 
United States Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes and the lead negotiator to the ICC treaty 
negotiations, reminded that “we must recall that the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals actually 
operated with the consent of the state of nationality of the defendants as a consequence of the 
surrender instruments signed by Germany and Japan, respectively.  In the case of Nuremberg, the 
Allied Powers also had supreme authority in Germany,”310 and the international tribunals was not 
founded on international law, but was “one of political power and one of war.”311  Therefore, 
since the accused Japanese and German citizens had never been to the United States, the 
petitioners in Hirota could never have expected to have constitutional protections.  In addition, as 
discussed supra, the cases dealing with international military tribunals reaffirmed the concept 
that “one state or group of states can set up military tribunals” to try enemies for war crimes that 
are captured within the territory they control.312 
 Second, the Supreme Court in Hirota was clear that its ruling would have been different if 
a United States citizen was making the appeal.313  And, this is consistent with the Court’s rulings 
in Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita, which dealt with enemy aliens.  Hirota also strengthens 
the argument presented in Reid v. Covert that United States citizens are still protected by the 
Constitution, even if tried abroad by a court of the United States. Therefore, if the Vice-President 
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or the General were making requests as United States citizens, under Hirota, courts would have 
been less inclined to take the international tribunals decisions at face value.   
The third argument is that because the enforcing power of the Tokyo tribunal was 
General MacArthur’s, an official of the United States, actions, even abroad, could be questioned 
by the Court.  In this regard, Justice Douglas’s concurrence in Hirota specifically asserted the 
Supreme Court would always have jurisdiction when the “conduct of its own officials” was in 
question.314  Justice Douglas went on to state, “the Constitution follows the flag” and General 
MacArthur was “an American citizen who [was] performing functions for our own government.  
It is our Constitution which he supports and defends.”315  By this reasoning, however, General 
MacArthur’s actions, not the tribunal’s decisions, could be questioned.  In the scenarios 
presented, the Vice-President and the General were performing official functions on behalf of the 
United States government.  Because of the “official status” of their acts, the Douglas concurrence 
would add credence to the fact that their actions, done under the authority of the United States 
Constitution, must be reviewed by governmental courts of that same authority.  Thus, since they 
were conducting official acts and can’t be considered enemy aliens, the ICC would conflict with 
the powers of Article III and, therefore, appear to be unconstitutional. 
Audrey Benison, a recent commentator of the constitutionality of the ICC, argues the 
recent case of Ntakirutimana v. Reno316 allows for non-enemy surrender to international criminal 
tribunals.317  The general rule in Ntakirutimana is there is no constitutional bar to prevent the 
surrender of a Rwandan citizen to face charges of genocide in the absence of an Article II 
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extradition treaty.318  This holding, however, is clearly limited to the rule that an extradition 
treaty is not required for a state to surrender an accused, and the Court did not even consider the 
constitutionality of the tribunal.  Finally, the Court was dealing with a Rwandan citizen, not a 
United States citizen.  The Rwandan citizen was a public figure in Rwanda during the tragedy in 
that State.  Therefore, Rwanda, and through it the Ad Hoc Tribunal, had a claim for jurisdiction.  
Unquestionably, the only issue was whether extradition could occur without a treaty, and  
therefore, the Ntakirutimana case is limited in scope and can never stand for the proposition 
United States citizens are to be surrendered to an international criminal tribunal. 
    (5) United States military and courts-martials 
 Although the enemy alien cases are distinguishable from the scenarios presented, it is true 
Article III courts do not judge United States military members tried by court-martial for 
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.319  Courts-martial are convened under the 
authority of Article II Commander-In-Chief powers, which permits courts-martial to sit in 
territory outside the United States.320  In Williams v. Froehlke, the appellate court stated “there 
must be federal criminal jurisdiction for a trial to properly occur in an Article III court.”321  In 
Williams, a military member was accused of committing a crime against a German citizen while 
stationed in Germany.  Since the crime was a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
and also a federal crime under 10 U.S.C. §922, a United States military court-martial was proper 
to try the accused military member in Germany.322   
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Thus, in the General’s scenario, the Court of Inquiry assumed jurisdiction over the 
General’s acts under the same legal standard.  However, because the courts-martial is a United 
States court, albeit not an Article III court, the Supreme Court still retains review authority under 
Article III.323  Therefore, Article III would be violated in the scenarios presented if the General 
would be barred from seeking relief from the Supreme Court. 
 The courts-martial distinction does not affect the Vice-President scenario.  Although 
acting as Commander-In-Chief, he is not subject to courts-martial jurisdiction because he is a 
United States civilian; and he is a United States civilian and within the territory of the United 
States where civil courts are available.  Also, under Ex Parte Milligan, the Vice-President is only 
subject to Article III courts.324  Conversely, the General acted outside the United States in the 
independent country of South Korea, and under the Williams case, the General would be subject 
to a court-martial by United States military authorities in South Korea.   
Nonetheless, the Williams case does not stand for the proposition that the United States is 
to surrender the General over to the ICC.   The General was cleared by a Court of Inquiry, and he 
would not face extradition because a United States tribunal has determined no probable cause in 
as much as the General acted reasonably.   Clearly, the Constitution was designed to control and 
limit the powers of government through separation of powers that must include an independent 
judiciary.325  Therefore, the executive and legislative branches cannot transfer the essential 
powers of the judiciary to a non-constitutional institution.  Such a transfer would appear to 
violate Article III of the Constitution. 
   b. The ICC as a violation of Article II powers 
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 Under Article II of the United States, the executive branch of the government has three 
powers that would come into conflict with the ICC structure.  First, the structure would conflict 
with the executive power to negotiate treaties; second, the powers enumerated as Commander-
In-Chief; and third, the pardon powers.  Although, for the United States to become a member of 
the ICC, the President is obligated to sign the treaty, which was done by President Clinton before 
he left office, the Supreme Court has held that the President is unable to surrender any executive 
authority.326  An argument that a federal court should bar an accused’s surrender to the ICC 
would be that the President has abandoned his constitutional duties under Article II. 
    (1) The treaty powers 
 Under Article II of the United States Constitution, the President has the power to make 
treaties with foreign nations, if two-thirds of the United States Senate consents.327  This treaty 
power is restricted only by the Constitution and “considerations of public policy and justice 
which controls civilized nations.”328  (Although it is hotly debated, the President has the 
exclusive authority to terminate a treaty outright,329 without the consent of the Senate.)330  Thus, 
Professor Louis Henkin argues the President’s treaty making power authorizes delegation of 
power to the ICC as long as the delegated power is subject to the same constitutional checks and 
balances of the other branches of government the President would face.331  In his view,  President 
would be able to assign enforcement powers to the ICC, much as a State court can adjudicate 
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federal crimes.332  The obvious counter-argument is that, by joining the ICC, the President would 
abdicate portions of his executive powers, which is a violation of the Constitution. 
 Under Article 86 of the ICC Statute, member States have an obligation to cooperate fully 
with the ICC.333  The ICC determines what cooperation is required, not the member State.334  A 
failure to cooperate would result in a referral of the matter to the United Nations, or the 
Assembly of State Parties,335 which is not controlled by the United Nations and is outside the 
United Nations veto power of the United States.  Compounding the inability of the member State 
to control ICC powers is the provision of the ICC Statute that permits withdrawal from the ICC, 
but takes effect only after one year of the announced intention to withdrawal.336  During that year 
period, the member State is required to fulfill obligations to the ICC337 or face referral to the 
Assembly of State Parties.  Thus, these are clear restrictions on the ability of the United States 
President to fulfill his executed duties.338  Although the President would be able under domestic 
law to terminate the treaty, in theory, under the ICC treaty, the executive branch abdicates this 
ability for at least a one-year period.339   
                                                            
332 Louis Henkin, Arms Control and Inspection in American Law, 135-6 (1996). 
333 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 86, which states that “State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.” 
334 Id. at Art. 87. 
335 Id. at Art. 87(7), which states that “[w]here a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court 
contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers 
under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of State Parties, 
or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” 
336 Id. at 127(1). 
337 Id. at Art. 127(2) 
338 In De Geoffrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267, 10 S. Ct. 295, 33 L.Ed. 642 (188), the Supreme Court stated that the 
“treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are found in 
that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments…it would not be contended that it extends 
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.”  By taking the inverse of the argument, the treaty power cannot 
extend so far as to forbid what the Constitution authorizes. 
339 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 127. 
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Marquardt argues the inverse of this point, citing Missouri v. Holland340 as persuasive 
authority that the existence of the ICC treaty actually enhances the President’s ability to execute 
his constitutional duties, and, therefor, the ICC does not interfere with any constitutional 
provisions.341  As with the In Re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin cases discussed supra, however, 
Justice Holmes limited any such shadow on the Constitution.342  Justice Holmes stated the 
Federal government could enter into a treaty only where it does “not contravene any prohibitory 
words to be found in the Constitution,”343 explaining the Constitution’s superiority, as it relates 
to United States citizens, to any other instrument of international significance.344  In short, the 
United States is able to make treaties, but only so long as the treaty does not encumber any of the 
powers laid out in the Constitution, or change the “character of government.”345   
Marquardt also uses Wilson v. Girard to argue the Supreme Court avoids weighing in on 
decisions by other branches of government to enter into a treaty with a foreign country.346  
Wilson is most commonly used to buttress the President’s authority to enter into executive 
agreements to implement a treaty provision.347  The Court in Wilson, however, stated the 
wisdom of a treaty arrangement “is exclusively in the determination of the executive and the 
legislature.”348  But, this case can be distinguished on two points.  First, the Court was discussing 
a jurisdictional treaty issue between the United States and another sovereign nation, which 
                                                            
340 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920). 
341 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 131-132. 
342 Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
343 Id. 
344 Andreasen, supra note 227, at 727. 
345 See De Geoffrey, 133 U.S. at 267 (1890).  “The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms 
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its 
departments…It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.”  
346 Marquardt, supra note 237, at 114 citing Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530, 77 S.Ct. 1409, L. Ed. 2d. 1544 
(1957). 
347 Thomas M. Franck, et al., Foreign Relations and National Security Law, 427 (2nd ed. 1993); Stephen Dycus et 
al., National Security Law, 199 (2nd ed. 1997). 
348 Wilson, 354 U.S. at 530. 
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reiterated the territoriality jurisdiction rule decided in the Schooner Exchange case,349 and 
discussed supra.    
Second, the treaty in question was the SOFA between the United States and Japan.350  
The Wilson case involved a Specialist Third Class Girard, who while stationed in Japan, fired 
spent shells out of his grenade launcher toward Japanese civilians and killed one.351  Under the 
SOFA, primary jurisdiction over Girard was with the United States military,352 yet, the United 
States waived primary jurisdiction in the case of Girard.353  Clearly the United States never 
abrogated its right to retain jurisdiction under the SOFA, as it would in the ICC treaty, but 
instead merely waived its primary jurisdiction and in the isolated case of Girard.  This permitted 
Japan to assert its jurisdiction of the military member under the territoriality doctrine. 
Given these distinctions, Wilson clearly does not stand for the proposition that the Court 
will avoid interference with the ability to make treaties that grants away criminal jurisdiction, as 
Marquardt infers.  The case merely stands for the proposition that, in a treaty which gives the 
United States primary criminal jurisdiction,354 the executive may waive jurisdiction to another 
sovereign State that also has jurisdiction.   
This reasoning cannot be used in the context of the ICC treaty, which allows for 
concurrent jurisdiction, but which, in reality, permits the ICC to assert primary jurisdiction if the 
member State fails to meet expectations.  In addition, the ICC cannot be considered a sovereign 
                                                            
349 Wilson, 354 U.S. at 529 citing The Schooner Exchange, 7 Cranch at 136 stating that sovereign nations have 
exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses within its borders. 
350 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632, 
1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 4510.  This treaty superceded Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security 
Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 2492, which was in force when 
Wilson case arose. 
351 Wilson, 354 U.S. at 526. 
352 Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 135. 
353 Id. 
354 It should also be noted that without the SOFA treaty with Japan, the military member would be subject to 
Japanese law for criminal acts under the territoriality principle.  Therefore, if the General were arrested in Korea for 
his acts, he could be tried there or in the ICC for his crimes. 
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State.  In the scenarios presented, the United States did not waive jurisdiction, but rather handled 
both cases within the United States judicial system.  Therefore, Wilson would not be persuasive 
authority for the scenarios presented because the United States acted upon its jurisdiction, rather 
than waiving this right. 
As discussed supra, within the context of the territoriality jurisdiction principle, the 
United States may negotiate as to which country will exercise primacy of jurisdiction even when 
the offenses remain within the judicial power of the United States.355  In effect, the United States 
may give up jurisdiction of an individual to another sovereign State when it concludes that State 
has a stronger claim on the criminal offense.  The ICC, not being a sovereign nation, but rather 
an international organization, therefore will not have standing to assert territorial jurisdiction.  
Thus, since the ICC treaty would change not only the powers under the United States executive 
branch, but also the legislative and judicial branches, the ICC treaty is unconstitutional. 
    (2) The power of the Commander-In-Chief 
 The United States Constitution provides for the power over the United States military to 
be held, principally, by the executive branch.356  As Commander-In-Chief, the President has vast 
authority to respond to attacks against the United States.357  In responding to attacks, the 
President will be granted absolute immunity for any official acts taken within that authority.358  
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, Justice Powell stated for the Court that alternative checks, such as 
impeachment and congressional scrutiny, would provide adequate assurances the President was 
not “above the law.”359  Since, in our scenario, the Vice-President was Acting President under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Vice-President would also be entitled to this absolute 
                                                            
355 Wilson, 354 U.S. at 529. 
356 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 1. 
357 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 17 L. Ed. 459, 2 Black 635 (1863) which held that the determination of the 
extent of an armed challenge to the United States rests with the President. 
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immunity.360  Since the immunity has its foundation in the separation of powers, a treaty could 
not contravene it.  (However, it is noteworthy that, if the Vice-President was impeached for the 
acts stated in the scenario, the Vice-President would then be liable and subject to indictment.)361 
 The ICC treaty would undermine this presidential immunity.  Article 27 of the ICC 
Statute clearly states that immunities, whether under international or national law, is not a bar for 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.362  Thus, the Ad Hoc Tribunals have set the standard for this 
elimination of immunities when it requested the surrender of ex-President Soloban Milosevic 
from the Former Yugoslavia.363  This same approach could be applied in the case of the Vice-
President’s scenario, and a claim of absolute immunity would not be a viable defense to an 
assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC.  Thus, since the Vice-President would not have this defense, 
a serious issue of constitutionality of the ICC treaty, which constrains the powers and immunities 
of the United States executive branch, would be raised. 
Another, serious issue is that the President, who is responsible for directing the 
Department of Justice to investigate alleged criminal acts, as in the case of the Vice-President, 
could be hindered from carrying out his constitutional duties.  As with the ICC, the Ad Hoc 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
358 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). 
359 Id at 758. 
360 There is also an argument that the General would have the same “privileges and immunities therein referred to 
shall be those accorded to diplomatic envoys by international law.” See Army Handbook, supra note 210, at 16-21.  
In the General scenario, the General was the Commander of the Military Component of the United Nations 
Peacekeeping operation in Korea. 
361 U.S. Const. art. I, §3, states that any party convicted of impeachment “shall…be liable and subject to indictment, 
trial, judgment, and punishment according to the law.” 
362 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 27, which states: “(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without 
any distinction based on official capacity.  In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a 
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a 
person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence.  (2)  Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether 
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.” 
363 See Jeremy Rifkin, The Milosevic Precedent Is One We Are Bound To Regret, Los Angeles Times, July 2, 2001, 
at B11. 
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Tribunals are assumed to have complimentary jurisdiction.364  An aspect of this jurisdiction is 
that, if a State is conducting its own investigation and beginning the preparation of criminal 
proceedings against the individual, the ICC and the Ad Hoc Tribunals should defer investigation 
and assumption of jurisdiction until the State is finished.365  In the Milosevic case, the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal did not wait until the national court had finished its judicial process before demanding 
jurisdiction.366  This problem could also permit the ICC to interfere with executive powers of the 
President of the United States367 – such as law enforcement duties – in violation of the United 
States Constitution. 
 In addition, the President will be hindered in the application of military force – such as in 
peacekeeping missions.368  Commanding generals could second guess the orders of the President 
because the ability to defend their decision before a Court of Inquiry will be diminished.  Under 
the scenarios presented, the Vice-President, the General, and others who followed the orders of 
these officials might be subject to prosecution by the ICC.369  Thus, political and military leaders 
                                                            
364 See David Scheffer, Development In International Criminal Law: The United States and the International 
Criminal Court, 93 A.J.I.L. 12, 19 (1999) which states that complimentary jurisdiction is flawed.  [“Complimentary 
is not a complete answer, to the extent that it compels States to investigate the legality of humanitarian interventions 
or peacekeeping operations that they already regard as valid official actions to enforce international law.  Even if the 
United States has conducted an investigation, the ICC could decide by a 2-to-1 vote and launch its own investigation 
of the United States citizens.”] 
365 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 18(2). 
366 See Rifken, supra note 372. 
367 The ICC may also interfere with Congress’ War Powers under Article I.  A Court must give “particular deference 
to the determination of Congress, made under its authority to regulate the land and naval forces.” See Middendorf v. 
Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976) citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S. Ct. 
1045, 97 L. Ed. 1508 (1953), which stated that “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned 
to meet certain overriding demand of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not agencies which must determine 
the precise balance to be struck in this adjustment.  The Framers especially entrusted that task to Congress.” 
368 See McNerny, supra note 235, at 188, who states that in the wake of the war in Kosovo, many Non-
Governmental Organizations were calling for the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal to investigate the United States 
and NATO Allies for their bombing campaigns; See Henry Kissinger, Does America Need A Foreign Policy? 
Toward A Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 280 (2001), which states that Amnesty International supported a 
complaint to “Louis Arbour, then prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
alleging that crimes against humanity had been committed during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.  Arbour 
ordered an internal staff review.”  
369 Grigorian, supra note 215, at 12; See Seguin, supra note 193, at 91. 
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who are constitutionally responsible for the United States’ foreign policy could be hindered in 
their ability to carry out their duties.370  
    (3) The pardon power 
 The United States Constitution provides for the President to have “the power to grant 
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.”371 Although the concept of 
presidential pardon is not specifically discussed within the ICC treaty,372 it is clear the subject 
matter of the ICC includes acts that are crimes under United States law.373  Thus, an 
interpretation of Article 27 would show such a pardon irrelevant in the eyes of the ICC, even 
when the subject matter is within the scope of the United States judiciary.374  So, for example, in 
the case of the Vice-President scenario, under the ICC, the fact that he was pardoned by the 
President would be irrelevant and not bar prosecution by the ICC.   
Historically, the pardon power has been a powerful tool for the United States in uniting 
the country after a contentious period.375  In fact, the last time a United States military member 
was convicted of war crimes during the Vietnam War,376 the President used his pardon powers to 
first commute the death penalty sentence to life imprisonment, and then, later, to afford another 
                                                            
370 See Bolton, supra note 211, at 194. 
371 U.S. Const. art II, §2, cl. 1. 
372 The other issue is one of granted immunity, which is different from the absolute immunity discussed supra.  If 
the Vice-President of the General were to enter into an immunity deal with the United States government before a 
required turnover to the ICC, then the executive has an obligation to enforce the immunity agreements and not 
surrender a person to the ICC, despite the treaty. See  Bassouni, supra note 184, at 247.  For similar court decisions 
arising under a Status of Forces Agreement see Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983). 
373 See 18 U.S.C. §§1091, 2441, which makes genocide and war crimes federal crimes. 
374 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 27.  
375 The pardon by President Gerald Ford of President Richard Nixon after the Watergate scandal is one example.  
The general amnesty proclaimed by the United States in relation to Confederate soldiers during the Civil War is 
another example. 
376 See United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 1973 CMA LEXIS 627; 48 C.M.R. 19 (December 21, 1973), 
where the conviction of appellant soldier for murdering unarmed prisoners of war was valid because person of any 
level of intelligence should have realized orders to kill everyone encountered by platoon were illegal. 
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reduction to parole.377  The President’s rationale for this action was the necessity to heal the 
nation and move forward by putting the past behind the nation.  In addition, as discussed supra, 
commentators argue that the ICC cannot interfere with a SOFA.378  However, the SOFA treaties 
specifically states that if an individual has been pardoned, “he may not be tried again for the 
same offense within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.”379  This 
language, therefore, directly contradicts the authority to be ceded to the ICC, thus making the 
SOFA’s less effective. 
 The promoters of the ICC argue that when there is a “clear conflict between the 
constitutional and international law, national law determines the hierarchy between the two.”380  
National law encompasses treaties, statutes, common law, and the Constitution.  When there is a 
conflict between international law and the Constitution, the Constitution trumps every time 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.381  The pardon power, being a part of the Constitution, cannot 
be amended because the “Executive, or the Executive and Senate combined” cannot amend the 
Constitution by “means other than those prescribed by the Constitution.”382  Since joining the 
ICC would theoretically amend the Constitution by taking away powers that the Constitution 
grants, the ICC is unconstitutional without a constitutional amendment. 
   c. The ICC as a violation of Article I 
 Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to “constitute 
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”383  Under Article II, the Senate must concur by two-
                                                            
377 See Grigorian, supra note 215, at 12 stating that United States citizens have been accused of and are capable of 
committing atrocities and using the My Lai case as an example.. 
378 Paust, supra note 242, at 11. 
379 See NATO SOFA, supra note 274, at Art. VII, §8. 
380 Duffy, supra note 190, at 16. 
381 U.S. Const. art. VI, §2; Reid, 351 U.S. 487, brought about the general acceptance of the fact that international 
agreements of all kinds are subject to constitutional limits. 
382 Frank, supra note 356, at 299. 
383 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 9. 
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thirds vote United States entry into a treaty.384  The ICC as an inferior court to the Supreme 
Court was discussed, supra, and it appears clear the ICC would violate Article III and Article I if 
the ICC was anything other than an inferior to the Supreme Court.  However, one of the favorite 
arguments of pro-ICC commentators is that the constitutional concerns are negated by the Define 
and Punish Clause385 of Article I.386  Marquardt, for example, argues this clause can “sustain the 
creation of a non-Article III tribunal to try citizens of the United States.”387  He goes on to argue 
that this clause justifies the ICC in the same way territorial and military courts are permissible, 
because the creation of these types of courts is an exercise of powers of general governance.388  
He also argues, since there is no other reference to “laws of nations” in the Constitution, 
Congress can determine how to enforce violations of such laws outside of Article III.389 
 As discussed supra, in dealing with the contradictions of the ICC with Article III, 
Marquardt relies on Ex Parte Quirin, In Re Yamashita, and Missouri v. Holland to support the 
notion that Congress has authority to recognize international courts under the Define and Punish 
Clause.390  The two war related cases of Ex Parte Quirin and In Re Yamashita dealt with enemy 
non-citizen aliens, and the treaty case of Missouri v. Holland established that the Constitution 
could not be violated or superceded by a treaty.  Noteworthy, the Court in the In Re Yamashita 
case does not refer to the Define and Punish clause, but rather relates to the Articles of War 
passed by Congress.391  The power to declare war falls under a different clause392 than the Define 
and Punish Clause.  Finally, Marquardt’s argument is, at best, novel, since the Define and Punish 
                                                            
384 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
385 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 10, which states that a power of Congress is “[t]o define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, and offenses against the laws of nations.” 
386 Marquardt, supra note 216, at 131. 
387 Id. at 127. 
388 Id. at 128 citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974). 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 130. 
391 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 6. 
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Clause has never been used to justify the creation of an international tribunal to punish crimes or 
cited in conjunction with the Article II treaty power.393 
Contrary to Marquardt’s argument, the more persuasive interpretation of the Define and 
Punish clause is, first, that Congress is empowered to recognize violations of the law of nations, 
i.e., jus cogens; second, Congress may define punishments for such violations by United States 
citizens to be enforced by the executive and adjudged by the judiciary under the constitutional 
framework.394  (Congress is not authorized to pass judgment on a violation of the laws of nation, 
because that power is reserved to Article III courts.395)  This interpretation squares with historical 
definitions of the Define and Punish Clause.  The Clause may have been placed in the 
Constitution to allow the Federal government to have jurisdiction over criminal acts that occur 
against Ambassadors by common citizens, which is not only a violation of the laws of nations, 
but also, such acts are within the jurisdiction of State authorities.396  Thus, the Define and Punish 
Clause does not appear to be authority permitting the United States to join the ICC. 
B. Constitutional Protection Concerns 
Besides the institutional concerns discussed supra, the Constitution would not allow 
United States citizens to be tried before an international court that does not guarantee the full 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
392 See U.S. Const. §8, cl. 11. 
393 Benison, supra note 236, at 103. 
394 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S. on the Feasibility of and the 
Relationship to the Fed. Judiciary of an Int’l Crim. Court, reprinted in Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
International Criminal Court, S. Rep. No. 71, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1993), which stated this “provision 
authorizes Congress to legislate on international crimes, and therefore implicitly empowers the U.S. courts created 
under Article III to adjudicate violations of such laws.” 
395 Newman, supra note 284, at 556, citing Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: 
Owing a Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, ASIL NEWSL (American Soc’y of Int’l Law, Wash., D.C.), 
Mar-May 1994 at 1, 6-9 which states that although Congress has the power to define and punish offenses against 
law of nations, the task of defining this role of international law “in the nations fabric has fallen to the courts.” 
396 Ronan Doherty, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal Law Implicates Federal 
Responsibility Under International Law, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1281, 1334 (1996). 
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range of constitutional protections397 criminal defendants have when they are tried before a 
United States court.398  One commentator argues this “criticism that under the ICC United States 
service personnel will be denied due process protections that they would enjoy under the 
Constitution is totally misplaced.  I can think of no right guaranteed to military personnel by the 
United States Constitution that is not also guaranteed by the treaty of Rome.”399  This statement 
is not correct.  Although there are several questionable comparisons between the rights 
guaranteed under the ICC Statute and that of the Constitution, it is clear a defendant before the 
ICC will not receive a trial by jury.   
 As discussed supra, since the ICC may be considered an extension of the United States, 
the level of protection should not change merely because the government agrees to participate in 
the ICC through ratification of a treaty.400  Although many commentators argue the ICC does not 
guarantee several of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights,401 the most glaring exception is the 
right to a jury trial.402  The ICC does not have the option for a defendant to be tried by a jury of 
                                                            
397 The ICC takes a leap when discussing procedural rights of individuals before an international organization 
because “the assumption of the classical law that only states have procedural capacity is still dominant and affects 
the contents of most treaties…” See Brownlie, supra note 260, at 581; See Stenier, supra note 334, at 712 stating 
that “these rights are indispensable to setting limits to governmental action, particularly when they are coupled with 
judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.”  
398 Curabba, supra note 9, at 12; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report of the Judicial Conf. of  the U.S. 
on the Feasibility of and the Relationship of the Fed. Judiciary and Int’l Crim. Court, reprinted in Senate Report 
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Criminal Court, S. Rep. No. 71, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1993); 
See Scheffer, supra note 137, at 17, which states that due process protection occupied an enormous amount of the 
United States’ delegations efforts because they were trying to satisfy that the United States Constitution 
requirements would be met with respect to the rights of defendants before the ICC. 
399 Leigh, supra note 241, at 131. 
400 Curabba, supra note 9, at 12-13, stating that because ratified treaties and federal statutes have equal force, and 
both are subordinate to the Constitution, as discussed supra, the federal government cannot do through a treaty what 
it cannot do through federal legislation. 
401 Constitutional protections that are absent from the ICC are: (1) the protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 889 
(1968); (2) the protection against double jeopardy, see Marquardt, supra note 216, at 133.; and (3) that many of the 
subject matter crimes would be void for vagueness, see Scheffer, supra note 137, at 21, Supple, supra note 269, at 
196, Barrett, supra note 216, at 104, Bolton, supra note 211, at 189 discussing the crime of aggression as being 
vague. 
402 Curabba, supra note 9, at 13 
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their peers.403  Commentators argue the right to trial by jury is not required by the Constitution 
for military members, however, they are silent when discussing civilians such as the Vice-
President.404  
 The argument that the right to a trial by jury is not required for military members is 
faulty.  Article V of the United States Constitution specifically states that the trial of all crimes 
shall be by jury.405  Commentators who argue that a military member is not entitled to a trial by 
jury do not cite Article V, but rather point to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for justification.406  
This argument has several flaws.  First, The constitutional language of the Fifth Amendment 
discusses Grand Jury investigations only and when discussing military forces, Grand Juries are 
only not necessary when the member is actual service “in time of War or public danger.”407  In 
fact, military members who face a general court-martial do receive a pre-trial hearing to 
determine whether there is probable cause to proceed with trial.408  Second, if the Sixth 
Amendment is taken by itself or only in coordination with the Fifth Amendment, it is 
conceivable that a jury trial is only applicable within the United States409 – which would exclude 
the ICC from following this rule because the Court will based in The Hague, Netherlands.  
However, Article V clearly requires trial by jury for criminal acts for which the United States has 
                                                            
403 ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 39, which provides for trial by judges only. 
404 See Leigh, supra note 241, at 130; See Magraw, supra note 3, at 7; See Marquardt, supra note 216, at 126; See 
Seguin, supra note 193, at 108; See Supple, supra note 269, at 185. 
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408 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 32. 
409 U.S. Const. amend VI, which states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed…” 
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jurisdiction even if the act was not committed within the United States.410  The concept that a 
defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury when the criminal act was within the jurisdiction of the 
United States was reiterated in Reid, where the defendant was tried by court-martial without a 
jury while in England.411  
 The American Bar Association cites Middendorf v. Henry as stating that the Constitution 
does not support the argument that a jury trial is available to military members,412 even as crimes 
against the United States.413  Middendorf does not stand for that proposition.  In that case, ex-
Marines, who were discharged pursuant to a summary court-martial, argued that their Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated because they were not given counsel and did not receive a jury 
by trial.414  A summary court-martial cannot be compared to a trial before the ICC.415  First, 
summary court-martial can not be used for capital offenses,416 which under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice includes all the offenses within the subject matter of the ICC – i.e. rape,417 
murder,418 war crimes,419 etc.  For these types of offenses, a jury trial by general court-martial is 
required.420   
Second, a summary court-martial is not mandated.  A military member could elect not to 
be judged by a summary court-martial and then either a special or general court-martial would 
                                                            
410 See U.S. Const. art. V., §2, cl. 3. 
411 Reid v 354 U.S. at 6-10. 
412 See Benison, supra note 236, at 99, where Ex Parte Milligan is attempted to be used by the commentator to show 
that military members lose their right to a trial by jury upon entering the military.  However, the use of that case is 
disingenuous in the sense that Ex Parte Milligan deals with civilians, not military members.  In addition, in times of 
conflict, certain rights that military members could expect to have as citizens are set aside during the conflict period.  
See Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 31 S.Ct. 230, 55 L.Ed. 225 (1911); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S.Ct. 
2574, 41 L.Ed.2d. 439 (1974); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).  In addition, Benison agrees that 
the “civilian-military distinction has eroded in the modern conduct of war.”  
413 Magraw, supra note 3, at 7. 
414 Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 30. 
415 One of the biggest distinctions is that summary courts-martial cannot adjudicate cases involving officers. See 10 
U.S.C. §820.  The ICC Statute specifically targets military commanders. See ICC Statute, supra note 5, at Art. 28. 
416 See Uniform Code of Military Justice at Art. 20. 
417 Id. at Art. 120. 
418 Id. at Art. 118. 
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automatically be convened with a sitting jury.421  Article 20 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice specifically provides that “[n]o person with respect to whom summary courts-martial 
have jurisdiction may be brought to trial before a summary courts-martial if he objects 
thereto…”422  Therefore, as in civilian courts, if a military member wishes to waive a jury trial 
by having a summary court-martial, that is within their prerogative. 
Third, a summary court-martial is procedurally different from a regular criminal trial.  “In 
the first place, it is not an adversary proceeding.”423  The ICC is adversarial in nature.424  Since it 
is an adversary proceeding, a necessary element is met to conclude that the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial is required.425  Finally, the Court specifically stated in Middendorf, that they 
have not had the occasion to determine whether the Sixth Amendment should apply to general 
and special courts-martial, which are adversarial in nature, because military are guaranteed that 
right through federal statute.426  However, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Middendorf is clear 
indication that if Sixth Amendment rights were in question, “surely those sworn to risk their lives 
to defend the Constitution should derive some benefit from” the Sixth Amendment.427 
Using the right to a jury trial as an example, it is evident that, for the United States to be a 
member of the ICC, the ICC must allow comparable rights found in the Bill of Rights.  This is 
especially true since the ICC will be considered an extension of the United States and its judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
419 See Rules of Courts-Martial, §201(f)(1)(B). 
420 Id. at §501. 
421 Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 28. 
422 Uniform Code of Military Justice at Art. 20; See 10 U.S.C. §820. 
423 Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 40. 
424 See ICC Statute, supra note 5, art. 67. 
425 See Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 40. 
426 Id. at 50 (Powell, J., concurring) citing 10 U.S.C. §827; See also Ex Part Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 where the Court 
states that “the trial by jury must be reserved in all cases that such a right is recognized.”  Since the right is 
recognized by statute, then trial by jury is mandated. 
427 Middendorf, 425 U.S. at 51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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authority.  Without the procedural due process guarantees, the United States cannot become a 
member State to the ICC.  
V. Conclusion 
 The movement towards human rights and the modern concept of international 
humanitarian law is directly linked to the concept of democracy and constitutionalism.428  The 
United States would not be encouraging this movement by forsaking certain principles upon 
which the United States Constitution is founded.  By forcing the ICC into a parallel existence 
with the United States judicial system, the constitutional framework and separation of powers 
that has worked extremely well for the United States would be in jeopardy.  Constitutional 
compatibility must be addressed before the United States considers joining the ICC.429  
 At the very least, the constitutional rights – such as a right to a jury trial – that every 
United States citizen expects should be required of the ICC.   The only possibility of the United 
States joining the ICC treaty is through a constitutional amendment, as France recently did with 
its Constitution.430 However, before the United States gives away the constitutional rights of its 
military and political leaders, it should consider that these people are the same individuals who 
have pledged to defend the constitutional privileges of their fellow citizens.  The ICC “represents 
such a fundamental change in American constitutional practice that a full national debate and the 
full participation of Congress are imperative.”431   
                                                            
428 Steiner, supra note 334, at 710. 
429 See Duffy, supra note 190, at 38. 
430 On the basis of the advice of its Conseil Constitutionnel (No. 98-408 DC of 22 January 1999, summarized in 2:5 
ASIL INTERNATIONAL LAW IN BRIEF 9-10 (May 1999)), France recently amended its Constitution in order to 
allow it to ratify the ICC Statute. 
431 Kissinger, supra note 377, at 279. 
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 If the rest of the world feels the need to band together to form an international court 
because their own national systems are inadequate – so be it.432  However, the United States 
should not break a constitutional system – albeit with some flaws – that balances power and 
protects the common citizen by rushing blindly into a treaty that will be unconstitutional.    The 
United States currently refuses to ratify the ICC treaty until its concerns – which include 
constitutional compatibility – are met.433  This should continue to be the United States policy. 
                                                            
432 See Bolton, supra note 211, at 203, which states that if “the Signatories of the Rome Statute have created an ICC 
to their liking, and they should live with it.” 
433 See Curabba, supra note 9, at 22. 
